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Strengthening Tax-Accountability Links: Fiscal Transparency and 
Taxpayer Engagement in Ghana and Sierra Leone 
 
Vanessa van den Boogaard, Wilson Prichard, Rachel Beach and Fariya 
Mohiuddin 
 
 
Summary 
 
There is increasingly strong evidence that taxation can contribute to expanded government 
responsiveness and accountability. However, such positive connections are not guaranteed. 
Rather, they are shaped by the political and economic context and specific policies adopted 
by governments and civil society actors. Without an environment that enables tax bargaining, 
there is a risk that taxation will amount to little more than forceful extraction. We consider 
how such enabling environments may be fostered through two mixed methods case studies 
of tax transparency and taxpayer engagement in Sierra Leone and Ghana.  
 
We highlight two key sets of findings. First, tax transparency is only meaningful if it is 
accessible and easily understood by taxpayers and relates to their everyday experiences and 
priorities. In particular, we find that taxpayers do not just want basic information about tax 
obligations or aggregate revenue collected, but information about how much revenue should 
have been collected and how revenues were spent. At the same time, taxpayers do not want 
information to be shared with them through a one-way form of communication, but rather 
want to have spaces for dialogue and interaction with tax and government officials, including 
through public meetings and radio call-in programmes. Second, strategies to encourage 
taxpayer engagement are more likely to be effective where forums for engagement are 
perceived by taxpayers to be safe, secure, and sincere means through which to engage with 
government officials. This has been most successful where governments have visibly 
demonstrated responsiveness to citizen concerns, even on a small scale, while partnering 
with civil society to foster trust, dialogue and expanded knowledge. 
 
These findings have significant implications for how governments design taxpayer education 
and engagement programmes and how civil society actors and development partners can 
support more equitable and accountable tax systems. Our findings provide concrete lessons 
for how governments can ensure that information shared with taxpayers is meaningful and 
accessible. Moreover, we show that civil society actors can play important roles as 
translators of tax information, enablers of public forums and dialogues around tax issues, and 
trainers of taxpayers, supporting greater tax literacy and sustained citizen engagement.  
 
Key words: tax and accountability; taxpayer education; fiscal transparency; tax literacy; 
taxpayer engagement; civil society. 
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Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, taxation has moved high on the international development 
policy agenda (e.g. African Development Bank 2011; Addis Tax Initative Declaration 2015; 
IMF and World Bank 2015). International actors increasingly argue that augmenting domestic 
revenue mobilisation can not only provide sustainable financing for development but can also 
contribute to the expansion of ‘tax bargaining’ between states and their citizens. In turn, tax 
bargaining can result in the building of ‘fiscal social contracts’ and more responsive and 
accountable states. These potential links between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability are underpinned by a relatively simple logic: when forced to pay taxes, citizens 
are more likely to make demands of government in return for tax payment, while 
governments in need of tax revenues will be more likely to make concessions to those 
taxpayers in order to encourage quasi-voluntary tax compliance. Whether or not these links 
develop in practice is of critical importance to the global development policy agenda: taxation 
is not socially desirable in its own right, but only becomes so if translated into improved 
services and broader benefits. 
 
Encouragingly, there is increasingly strong evidence that the expansion of taxation can 
contribute to expanded responsiveness and accountability. This evidence comes from a 
growing array of cross-country econometric studies (Prichard, Salard and Segal 2014; Ross 
2004), sub-national comparative studies (Gadenne 2017), qualitative case studies of tax 
reform experiences (Jibao and Prichard, 2015; Kangave and Katusiimeh 2015; Kjær and 
Ulriksen 2014; Prichard 2015), and experimental studies (de la Cuesta, Milner, Nielson and 
Knack 2017; Martinez 2019; Paler 2013). There is now little doubt of the potential for taxation 
to contribute to efforts to strengthen broader governance. 
 
However, while recent research shows that taxation can lead to expanded responsiveness 
and accountability, it equally makes clear that such positive connections are not guaranteed. 
Whether or not taxation leads to broader governance gains is shaped by the political and 
economic context, as well as by the specific policies and strategies adopted by governments, 
civil society actors, and taxpayers. Recent research has characterised this as a bargaining 
problem: strong tax-accountability links are more likely to emerge where taxpayers have the 
motivation, resources and power to make successful demands on governments for 
reciprocity (Prichard 2015; Bak 2019). Fundamentally, without an environment that enables 
tax bargaining, there is a risk that taxation will amount to little more than forceful extraction.  
 
We consider how such enabling environments may be fostered and how positive connections 
between taxation, accountability, and responsiveness may be encouraged and strengthened. 
Existing research suggests that that this may be achieved by improving public awareness 
and transparency; incentivising or directly supporting civil society engagement with, and 
collective action around, tax issues; and creating forums through which taxpayers can 
engage with the government (Prichard 2015). These findings point to the importance of 
enhancing the extent of engagement by, and the negotiating power of, taxpayers in order to 
strengthen responsiveness (the extent to which governments deliver services desired by 
taxpayers) and accountability (the extent to which governments are answerable to taxpayers 
and face sanctions for poor performance). While policymakers and development partners 
have increasingly incorporated these lessons into tax reform strategies, strategies focusing 
on tax transparency and taxpayer engagement have remained relatively marginal to reform 
efforts, while existing knowledge on taxation and accountability is too broad to provide the 
detailed operational guidance needed by policymakers and development partners. 
 
We build on existing findings, though aim to draw more precise and practical lessons and 
identify specific interventions and strategies that can be adopted by governments, civil 
society actors, and development partners to strengthen the links between taxation, 
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responsiveness, and accountability. To do so, we undertake two original case studies of tax 
transparency and taxpayer engagement in Sierra Leone and Ghana, involving surveys of 
over 3,300 taxpayers; over 50 focus group discussions with taxpayers, civil society 
representatives, and policymakers; and in-depth interviews with over 60 key stakeholders in 
government, civil society organisations, and donor agencies. In each case, we assess the 
state of efforts to support linkages between tax and accountability and, based on the 
perspectives of taxpayers themselves, highlight the strategies that are most effective in 
encouraging an enabling environment for tax bargaining.  
 
We consider the effectiveness of two broad types of initiatives. First, we explore efforts to 
enhance transparency, asking under what circumstances transparency initiatives are most 
likely to be successful in informing, empowering, and engaging taxpayers. Second, we 
examine the efficacy of attempts to spur popular engagement, asking what types of initiatives 
best enable and motivate citizens to engage with and make demands on the state around 
taxation. Given the relatively limited research exploring how to foster ‘tax bargaining’, these 
two case studies represent the primary contribution of this study and a useful starting point 
for more systematic exploration of tax-accountability linkages. 
 
Two findings are particularly salient. First, strategies to improve tax transparency are 
effective only if the information being provided and the channel through which it is being 
provided are accessible to taxpayers. Meaningful transparency requires information to be 
comprehensible to taxpayers – for instance, by being communicated in local languages – 
and to relate to everyday taxpayer experiences and priorities. In particular, we find that 
taxpayers do not just want basic information about tax obligations or aggregate revenue 
collected, but information about how much revenue should have been collected and how 
revenues were spent. At the same time, taxpayers do not want information to be shared with 
them through a one-way form of communication, but rather want to have spaces for dialogue 
and interaction with tax and government officials, including through public town hall meetings 
and radio call-in programmes. 
 
Second, strategies to encourage taxpayer engagement are more likely to be effective where 
forums for engagement are easily accessible to taxpayers, focus on local priorities and 
issues, and are perceived by citizens as safe, secure, and sincere means through which to 
influence government officials. Critically, these forums were most effective in encouraging 
taxpayer engagement where they allowed for anonymity and interaction and where 
governments visibly demonstrated responsiveness to citizen concerns, even on a small 
scale, while partnering with civil society to foster trust, dialogue and expanded knowledge. 
 
In addition, two findings challenge the conventional understanding of the roles of local 
authorities and taxpayers’ expectations of fiscal reciprocity in developing countries. First, in 
contexts with a limited tax base, tax revenues are insufficient to cover much more than the 
salaries of local governments or even the cost of raising this revenue. In such environments, 
tax revenues are often viewed by officials as ‘seed money’, signalling the local government’s 
due diligence and commitment to revenue raising to development partners and central 
governments with deeper pockets with which to finance public infrastructure such as roads 
and electricity grids. In our research, local government officials and taxpayers often saw the 
role of local government as to act as a local broker between residents and development 
partners, accountable for finding alternative means to make sparse taxes work for the good 
of the community. Secondly, misinformation about the rights conferred by the state by tax 
payment is pervasive in some contexts, reflecting a broader disconnect between taxpayer 
expectations about what can be expected from tax payment and the reality of what 
governments can provide. 
 
These findings have significant implications for how governments design taxpayer education 
programmes and how civil society actors and development partners can support more 
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equitable and accountable tax systems. Revenue authorities increasingly devote resources 
to taxpayer education and sensitisation, though with limited evaluations of taxpayer 
education programmes and correspondingly little evidence to suggest that their common 
approaches are effective or meaningful to support either greater compliance or accountability 
(e.g. Mascagni and Santoro 2018; OECD 2015).1 More broadly, taxpayer education 
programmes are often more focused on encouraging compliance rather than on engagement 
or accountability. Meanwhile, our findings suggest that civil society has a significant role to 
play to ensure that expanded tax efforts lead to more accountable and equitable tax systems. 
Civil society actors may play important roles as translators in making tax information 
meaningful to taxpayers and in communicating it through accessible channels; as enablers of 
taxpayer engagement forums and dialogues, bridging gaps of trust between citizens and the 
state; and as trainers, to ensure that tax literacy and engagement efforts are sustainable and 
grounded in local issues and priorities. Our research also points to particular areas where 
development partners may fill funding gaps in the short term, including with respect to key 
taxpayer education strategies, such as radio programming. 
 
In the next section we describe the research design, before turning our attention to 
approaches for strengthening tax-accountability links. Section 2 considers strategies to 
increase tax transparency, while Section 3 explores efforts to strengthen taxpayer 
engagement. Section 4 highlights the persistent challenges to achieving meaningful 
transparency and taxpayer engagement, and Section 5 summarises the key findings and 
implications for policymakers, donors, and civil society actors. 
 
 
1   Research methods 
 
Research examining the links between taxation, responsiveness, and accountability has 
largely focused on high-level understandings of the factors that contribute to more effective 
tax bargaining between taxpayers and government. The literature stresses the importance of 
transparency, public awareness, and taxpayer engagement, yet offers limited guidance to 
policymakers on how to actually achieve these goals. For instance, some forms of 
transparency are more effective than others, while greater transparency alone is not a 
guarantee of successful action (e.g. Buntaine, Daniels and Devlin 2018). Despite 
policymakers’ efforts to incorporate these high-level findings into reform programming, there 
is little indication that these efforts have led to meaningful results. For instance, despite an 
increased focus on taxpayer services and education (e.g. OECD 2015), many of these 
programmes have failed to generate large-scale improvements. Indeed, research continues 
to find that citizens find it difficult to know what they owe or how tax revenues are used (e.g. 
Aiko and Logan 2014; Isbell 2017), while sincere public-private dialogues or citizen 
consultations have yet to be adopted in many contexts (e.g. Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012). 
Given these two trends – limited practical research and a concern that existing programmes 
are failing to achieve their objectives – our research seeks to get closer to the micro-level 
dynamics shaping the ability of taxpayers to make demands on governments around 
taxation. First, we reviewed evidence of initiatives specifically aimed at empowering 
taxpayers to bargain with governments. Given the limited number of such cases in the Global 
South, however, our core contribution is an exploration of the dynamics of tax-accountability 
links in two case studies, Sierra Leone and Ghana. This has allowed for a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of taxpayer engagement with tax systems and of possible 
strategies for strengthening accountability and responsiveness. In particular, we have sought 
 
1  Mascagni, Santoro and Mukama (2019) provide one of the first rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of taxpayer 
education, showing that well-designed taxpayer education programmes can improve tax knowledge from a low baseline 
and can build a habit of tax compliance. 
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to uncover positive instances of enhanced transparency and constructive engagement 
related to taxation.  
 
In each country, throughout 2016 and 2017 we collected quantitative and qualitative data in 
eight sub-national case study districts, reflecting geographic variation as well as variation in 
urbanity and the nature of civil society engagement. Across the areas of study, we relied on 
three key sources of data. First, taxpayer surveys – 2,200 respondents in Sierra Leone and 
1,100 in Ghana – helped us to identify trends and patterns in taxpayer perspectives and 
experiences of engaging with tax issues and with public actors more broadly (Appendix 1). 
Second, over 50 focus group discussions across all sub-national locations helped us to shed 
light on the dynamics underlying taxpayer perspectives, while also allowing us to explore the 
perspectives of civil society, the business community (including small, medium, and large 
business owners), and government officials at various levels of administration (Appendix 2). 
Finally, we conducted over 60 semi-structured in-depth interviews with tax and government 
authorities, civil society representatives, and key stakeholders of the various accountability 
initiatives we could identify (Appendix 3). Despite the diversity of sub-national locations, in 
practice we find little variation in the perspectives of taxpayers, in taxpayer education 
programmes or in patterns of taxpayer engagement. Similarly, despite two country case 
studies with significant variation in terms of economic and developmental status and political 
foundations, we find a high degree of similarity in taxpayer perspectives and experiences 
across the two case studies. We thus focus on emphasising key messages about how to 
strengthen tax bargaining, though highlighting important cross-country and sub-national 
variation where it exists.  
 
 
2  Enhancing transparency 
 
Perhaps the most widely cited and pursued strategy for strengthening the links between 
taxation, responsiveness, and accountability has been the expansion of transparency around 
taxation and public spending. This is based in the idea that where taxpayers understand the 
taxes they pay, why they pay them, how much revenue is collected, and how revenues are 
used, they are more likely to feel motivated to make demands of government and to have the 
information to make those demands successfully (Prichard 2015; Bak 2019). It is thus 
expected that transparency will not only improve popular understanding of the tax system but 
will empower citizens through their access to new information.  
 
There is some evidence that greater transparency can support greater taxpayer 
engagement. For example, in Mozambique, efforts to inform citizens of their rights and 
responsibilities around taxation through in-depth citizen trainings and the development of 
social accountability committees effectively motivated citizen engagement (Nell and 
Mascagni 2017). Similarly, Prichard (2015) shows how earmarking new VAT revenues for 
popular education and health programmes in Ghana facilitated more effective monitoring by 
civil society actors. Essentially, with these reforms civil society could more easily identify 
poor performance, which then served as a focal point for advocacy. There is also some 
evidence that greater transparency can encourage greater government accountability. For 
example, Reinikka and Svensson (2011) explain that a newspaper campaign in Uganda that 
provided systematic information to monitor local officials’ handling of a large education grant 
program was associated with a reduction in the leakage of funds. They show that public 
access to information can be a powerful deterrent to corruption, while speculating that more 
informed parents may be more likely to demand accountability from the education system. 
 
However, it cannot be assumed that transparency will increase engagement, particularly 
when it comes to taxation. The simple fact of making information available is not a guarantee 
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that citizens will access it, find it useful or use it to make demands of government. For 
instance, despite an increasing use of taxpayer education by revenue authorities across 
Africa (see e.g. Mascagni and Santoro 2018), tax literacy remains low among taxpayers. 
While there is evidence that greater transparency can lead taxpayers to adopt more positive 
attitudes towards the state and tax compliance (e.g. Jibao and Prichard 2015; Katera, 
Fjeldstad and Ngalewa 2009; Mukama, Karangwa and Hakizimana 2017), we know little 
about whether and how transparency can lead to greater taxpayer engagement or 
government accountability. There are thus reasons to be sceptical of strategies that assume 
that transparency is a means to encourage tax bargaining or spur collective action. In some 
contexts transparency may even be counterproductive if it discourages participation – for 
example, by reducing the perceived efficacy or security of engagement (Buntaine et al. 
2018). Put simply, the effectiveness of transparency depends in critical ways on who 
information reaches and whether the information that reaches them is likely to encourage 
collective action. The importance of context-specificity cannot be understated.  
 
Rather than focusing on the transformative potential of transparency alone, Fung, Graham 
and Weil’s (2007) concept of ‘targeted transparency’ stresses the importance of providing 
complete, comprehensible, and relevant information to the party of interest if transparency 
initiatives are to be effective. In keeping with this logic, the key challenge is to better 
understand what types of information, delivered to whom, may be most effective in spurring 
engagement around taxation. Yet there has been little research into this question, while 
policy strategies to increase tax transparency have not sufficiently considered whether that 
transparency will be meaningful to taxpayers. For example, revenue authorities have widely 
adopted taxpayer education programmes in an effort to help taxpayers understand what 
taxes they need to pay, why, and how to do so. These programmes, however, have been 
designed primarily to encourage quasi-voluntary tax compliance among taxpayers (OECD 
2015). As such, they have not focused on providing information designed to empower 
taxpayers to engage with, and make demands on, government. Moreover, international and 
domestic policymakers have tended to focus on relatively formulaic means of increasing 
transparency, such as the posting of budget figures in government offices, though our 
evidence suggests that these efforts do not reach most citizens, that most citizens are unable 
to interpret budget figures, and that information is rarely provided in a timely manner. To 
complement current initiatives with strategies that more effectively engage citizens, we 
explore how to achieve meaningful transparency – that is, ensuring that information actually 
reaches taxpayers, is relevant to them, and can contribute to citizen empowerment and 
engagement. We first consider what information taxpayers currently have and how they 
access and use it, before considering how transparency efforts may be strengthened. 
 
2.1 The state of tax transparency in Sierra Leone and Ghana 
 
Despite the existence of transparency and taxpayer education programmes in both Sierra 
Leone and Ghana,2 taxpayers have limited information and understanding of the taxes they 
are supposed to pay and how tax revenues are used, with the absence of tax knowledge 
shaping attitudes towards the tax system. Overall, taxpayer knowledge about public finances 
is low.3 Approximately three-quarters of survey respondents (76 per cent in Sierra Leone and 
74 per cent in Ghana) reported that it is difficult to find out how the central government 
spends public revenues, with similar patterns observed at the local government level, where 
 
2 In both countries, there are taxpayer education programmes run by revenue authorities, billboards trumpeting the 
importance of paying taxes, and some level of formal rules around budget transparency. For example, in 2017 the 
Ghana Revenue Authority introduced the ‘Our Taxes, Our Future’ campaign in collaboration with local community 
leaders, radio stations, and information centres (e.g. Mascagni and Santoro 2018). In Sierra Leone, the National 
Revenue Authority has a nationwide taxpayer education programme (IMF 2019), which includes, among other activities, 
the posting of a customer service charter online, a call centre, and the production of various guides and business briefs 
(Adam Smith International n.d.). 
3 This is in line with findings from other research, including on small market traders in northern Ghana, that highlights 
challenges in accessing information about the tax system (Prichard and van den Boogaard 2017). 
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62 per cent and 70 per cent of respondents in Sierra Leone and Ghana, respectively, 
reported that it was difficult to find out how the government spends tax revenues.4 In focus 
group discussions across sub-national regions in Ghana, even where citizens reported being 
well informed on what taxes they paid, they were hard-pressed to say how the taxes were 
spent. At the same time, information about the broader tax system was widely reported to be 
difficult to obtain, including with respect to taxation of extractive industries (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 ‘Is the government transparent and open about how much it receives in 
royalties [from natural resource extraction]?’5 
 
 
Engagement with public debates or discussions around taxation was relatively limited, with 
the exception in Sierra Leone of discussion around the local (poll) tax, which, as it is 
administered by local chiefs, involves greater community engagement and information 
sharing than other taxes levied by the government (Figure 2). Public discussions in Ghana, 
meanwhile, largely focused on non-tax and informal revenues, including user fees, informal 
contributions to chiefs, and ‘acceleration’ fees – that is, informal payments to facilitate or 
expedite service from state agents. 
 
Figure 2 Percentage of respondents reporting that there has been public discussion or 
debate about a specific tax in the past three years, by tax type6  
 
 
This lack of information may have significant impacts: more than three-quarters of survey 
participants in Sierra Leone (76 per cent) and half in Ghana (50 per cent) noted that they 
would feel less vulnerable to inappropriate behaviour by tax officials – including coercion, 
manipulation, and demands for bribes – if they knew what taxes they were actually required 
 
4 Somewhat surprisingly, low levels of knowledge persist at the ward level, despite this being the most decentralised 
body, designed to be closer and more responsive to citizens. Unless otherwise stated, the sample size is 1,011 in 
Ghana and 2,203 in Sierra Leone. 
5 For Ghana, responses are the average responses across gold, oil, and other extractives. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘did not 
respond’ responses are excluded. 
6 Responses excluded for which less than two per cent of respondents noted that there had been a public debate or 
discussion. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Ghana
Sierra Leone Very open and transparent
Somewhat open and transparent
Minimally open and transparent
Not open and transparent at all
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Acceleration payments
Contributions/fees to chief or village head
Business licence
Government user/service fees
Poll tax
Market fees
Property tax
Import/export tariffs
Rental tax
Income taxes
Goods and services tax
Ghana
Sierra Leone
14 
 
to pay. This suggests that low tax literacy places citizens in a vulnerable position when 
interacting with tax authorities and limits their ability to productively engage with tax issues. 
In Sierra Leone, focus group participants and interview respondents were outspoken about 
the ways in which a lack of information about how revenues are spent undermines their 
confidence in the tax system. In turn, interviewees emphasised that a lack of trust in 
government discourages engagement with tax issues, as citizens are reluctant to engage 
with an untrustworthy government with whom they see little potential for responsiveness. As 
explained by a representative of the Network Movement for Democracy and Human Rights in 
Sierra Leone, the failure by local councils to fully explain to taxpayers how they use public 
money is also a reason for people’s reluctance to pay the local tax (cited in Remoe 2012). 
 
Critically, the government’s commitment to transparency is often seen as insincere or 
insufficient. As described by the Executive Director of the National Movement for Justice and 
Democracy in Sierra Leone, the ‘government is not consistent with the practice of 
transparency’, presenting transparency to citizens ‘as if it is a gift, not a right’.7 Further, a 
representative of the Budget Advocacy Network (BAN) in Sierra Leone highlighted the 
government’s failures in engaging in more meaningful transparency: ‘The accountability 
aspect goes beyond just telling people “this is what we’ve collected”, but it also goes with 
“This is what we’ve done with the money”. That one is lacking.’8 
 
Nevertheless, there are positive examples of the ways in which greater transparency can 
contribute to a positive dialogue between taxpayers and governments. For example, in Sierra 
Leone, Bo City Council has in recent years been heralded as a model of strong local revenue 
mobilisation and good governance, associated with improved engagement between 
government and taxpayers. A number of key factors played a role in Bo’s revenue success, 
including more stringent anti-corruption measures, public education programmes focusing on 
the links between revenue and expenditure, and new forums for taxpayer engagement with 
taxpayers (Jibao and Prichard 2015). As described by a representative of BAN,9  
 
One of the reasons [that Bo stands out in terms of local tax collection] has to do with 
how they engage the community on a monthly basis… they will tell you ‘this is what we 
have done and this is what we have collected and this is also what we are going to do 
for the following month’. So, because of that, it builds the trust and confidence in the 
citizens… that is why Bo City Council is up in terms of collecting local revenue. 
 
This taxpayer engagement was fostered under the political leadership of Mayor Wusu 
Sannoh, who prioritised tax reform in his electoral platform in part as a result of increased 
local political competition (Jibao and Prichard 2015). Electoral competition incentivised 
Sannoh to make promises regarding improved public service provision, which then required 
strengthened public support for raising local revenue in order to meet these electoral 
promises. Sannoh emphasised the contractual and reciprocal nature of taxation, and 
prioritised transparency and taxpayer engagement within the reforms. Bo represents an 
important example of the crucial role that improved taxpayer engagement, transparency, and 
sustained political leadership can have in strengthening the relationship between taxation 
and accountability. 
 
2.2  Achieving meaningful transparency 
 
Our evidence is clear: tax literacy in Sierra Leone and Ghana is low, impacting taxpayer 
vulnerability, trust in tax systems, and the potential for positive taxpayer engagement. Our 
evidence suggests that existing taxpayer education programmes and initiatives to increase 
 
7 Sierra Leone interview #14. 
8 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
9 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
15 
 
transparency are often not achieving their goals and, in some circumstances, are weakening 
the potential for strong tax-accountability links. Simply publishing information does not 
necessarily lead to greater accountability (see e.g. Rudiger 2018). How can more meaningful 
transparency be achieved? We focus first on what information is most relevant and how it 
can be made more accessible to taxpayers. We then consider what channels can most 
effectively reach the majority of taxpayers, given limitations of both infrastructure and of 
literacy.  
 
2.2.1 Providing meaningful information 
 
Two key findings stand out in thinking about how to make tax information more relevant and 
meaningful to citizens. First, citizens made clear that they primarily want to know how tax 
revenues are spent, to see results and to be reassured that tax revenues are not being 
misused (Figure 3). In shaping compliance decisions taxpayers reported that having access 
to such information was a higher priority than reducing corruption by tax collectors or 
politicians. This desire for information about how revenues are spent contrasts with the 
information that citizens actually receive. Indeed, public discussions of tax largely focused on 
sharing key information about tax liabilities, rather than on explaining how tax revenues are 
actually used (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3: ‘What, if anything, would increase your willingness to pay taxes to the 
central government?’10  
 
  
 
10 Multiple responses were permitted. 
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Figure 4  ‘If you participated in a public discussion or debate about a specific tax in 
the past three years, what information was provided?’11 
 
 
In line with evidence that citizens want to see how tax revenues are being spent, both Sierra 
Leone and Ghana have enjoyed some success in earmarking revenues for specific public 
goods. For example, previous research has shown that in Sierra Leone, informal earmarking 
of new revenues for specific purposes was critical to building popular engagement and 
support in Bo City Council in Sierra Leone (Jibao and Prichard 2015). In Ghana, increases in 
the VAT rate were only successfully introduced by earmarking new revenues for education 
and health spending (Prichard 2015). These cases indicate that in low trust environments, 
earmarking of tax revenues – that is, commitments to spend some or all of the revenue from 
a specific tax on a particular type of expenditure – may be useful in making the tax-
expenditure link explicit to taxpayers. This may, in turn, increase taxpayer confidence in 
government, and provide taxpayers with an explicit target around which to organise, engage 
and monitor the government’s performance.12 Such earmarking may be comparatively 
informal, in the form of a stated commitment by public officials, or highly formal, defined 
explicitly in the law. Despite its potential, revenue earmarking should be approached with 
caution as formal legal earmarks reduce budgetary flexibility, while informal commitments 
can be used for political purposes without having concrete effects on actual spending 
patterns if not carefully monitored (see e.g. Bird 2008; Junquera-Varela, Marijn, Shukla, 
Bernard, Awasthi and Moreno-Dodson 2017; Prichard 2015; Webber and Wildavsky 1986). 
 
The second key message is that taxpayers want to know how revenues are used in a way 
that is easily understandable and accessible. By design or accident, governments often do 
not present information clearly. For instance, although citizen service charters – which list the 
rate of common taxes and fees – were often present at local government offices in Sierra 
Leone and Ghana, they were often printed in an unreadable format that made them 
effectively incomprehensible.  
 
  
 
11 Data is only reported for discussions around a particular type of tax where more than 100 respondents had engaged in 
such a discussion in the previous three years. 
12 For instance, after market taxes were linked explicitly to the development of new market facilities in Guinea, tax 
collection doubled and there was increased community monitoring of tax collectors (Korsun and Meagher 2004). 
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Photo 1 Example of a posted citizen service charter, Koinadugu district, Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
Moreover, tax information can be technical, with citizens in Ghana describing, for example, 
being unable to gauge how much revenue should be collected from zonal areas versus what 
is actually reported. Similarly, while governments often publish public finance figures, the 
data is often not meaningful to taxpayers as it is too aggregated to relate to local realities. As 
explained by a civil society representative in Sierra Leone, ‘They [the government] can say 
the health sector spent 20 billion [Leones, or about US$3.6 million], [but] that information 
does not make sense to ordinary citizens’, as it does not relate to concrete services.13 
Instead, information should be provided in a way that is intuitive to taxpayers and that is 
disaggregated in a way that allows them to draw clear connections between spending 
categories and local service provision. Rather than publishing figures on ‘municipal services’, 
for example, local governments should aim to publish disaggregated budget lines, such as 
‘market repairs’ or ‘public toilet maintenance’. Breaking down government spending in this 
way makes the information more meaningful for taxpayers, allowing them a better 
understanding of what they are receiving in return for tax revenues and making engagement 
more likely by allowing them to verify whether revenues are being used as promised.  
 
More meaningful information may likewise include breakdowns of how much revenue is 
collected and from what sources. Making such information more readily available can 
empower taxpayers by giving them a clearer picture of the revenues available for 
government to spend on public priorities. More ambitiously, to encourage more constructive 
engagement with taxpayers, progressive governments may consider sharing data on rates of 
tax compliance – or publicly highlighting compliance records among the wealthy – in order to 
dispel scepticism about the accountability and equity of tax systems. 
 
In addition to being disaggregated, information is more relevant to taxpayers when it is 
provided in a timely and actionable manner that can provide the foundation for taxpayer 
engagement. As described by a civil society representative in Sierra Leone, ‘One of the 
challenges citizens have been facing has to do with access to comprehensive and adequate 
information in a timely manner... if [citizens] do not get the information on time, their 
participation [in public meetings about taxation] will be meaningless.’14 Indeed, when 
 
13 Sierra Leone interview #5. Exchange rate for 16 December 2016. 
14 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
18 
 
information relates to planned and actual revenue collections or budget expenditures, 
delayed transparency means that information loses its usefulness as a spur for taxpayer 
engagement. If information is only provided after all decision-making periods are over, 
citizens cannot influence real change, but can only register content or discontent with 
outcomes.   
 
2.2.2 Ensuring that information reaches citizens  
 
Even where information is meaningful to taxpayers, major challenges remain in ensuring that 
it actually reaches them. Conventional transparency initiatives often involve posting tax and 
budget information at government offices. For example, in Sierra Leone most districts post 
budget information and ‘citizen service charters’ on boards at the district councils, listing the 
cost of different government services, while the National Revenue Authority (NRA) and some 
local governments have also used billboards to provide information to citizens. In Ghana, 
local governments were, until recently, compelled to publish tax rates and revenue yields by 
sub-district areas on notice boards near or at the government offices. These types of 
transparency strategies, which in theory fulfil the goal of greater transparency, often have 
limited impact for four key reasons. 
 
First, in practice, and particularly at the sub-national level, information is not always shared. 
For example, in Sierra Leone, budget information is supposed to be provided at ward council 
offices, though spot checks at these ward council offices across the regions of study found 
that budget or revenue information was rarely posted. Local government officials themselves 
noted that they are not able to easily monitor these offices,15 thus limiting the effectiveness of 
any directives given to them by the district government. 
  
Second, even where information is made publicly available, our research shows that citizens 
often lack the capacity to access this information, given the logistical challenges of reaching 
district council offices including poor roads, high costs of transportation, and the distance of 
local government offices from rural villages.16 More fundamentally, many taxpayers reported 
feeling too intimidated to go to government offices to request or view information, particularly 
given the low levels of education and high rates of illiteracy that shape the power dynamics 
between citizens and the state. Accordingly, simply posting information is often viewed as an 
insincere way to fulfil mandated requirements for greater transparency. As described by a 
civil society representative in Sierra Leone, ‘There are times wherein the [local government] 
councils will just want citizens to participate, [so that they can] check the box [saying] that we 
gave citizens [information] or say CSOs participated in this particular aspect [of 
governance].’17 In short, it is not enough to simply publish information and wait for taxpayers 
to find it. 
 
Third, despite the need to reach out to taxpayers more proactively, governments are often 
limited in their capacity to do so because of poor infrastructure. For example, relying on 
postal services can result in limited coverage, even in urban areas and among wealthier 
taxpayers (Mascagni, Nell and Monkam 2017). While sending messages by SMS and email 
has been found in some contexts to be relatively effective in reaching taxpayers and eliciting 
greater tax compliance and engagement (Mascagni et al. 2017), the ability of the government 
to manage contact information is often challenging owing to frequent turnover of and sharing 
of mobile devices. For example, Mayega, Ssuuna, Mubajje, Nalukwago and Muwonge (2017: 
12) found lower than expected validity of phone numbers held by tax authorities, with 44 per 
 
15 Sierra Leone interview #31. 
16 Sierra Leone interview #31. 
17 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
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cent of total registered individual taxpayers in Uganda having duplicate phone numbers.18 
Accordingly, while some revenue authorities, including the NRA in Sierra Leone, have begun 
to communicate with taxpayers via SMS,19 it is not clear how meaningful this channel of 
information sharing will be.  
 
Moreover, access to the internet and mobile devices cannot be taken for granted. Despite 
mobile phones being an increasingly low-cost and ubiquitous option in much of sub-Saharan 
Africa (see Rotberg and Aker 2013), internet coverage is low outside of urban areas, limiting 
the overall reach of such channels of engagement. For example, 31 per cent of individuals in 
Sierra Leone in 2017 and 25 per cent in Ghana in 2018 reported owning a phone capable of 
internet access (Afrobarometer 2016/2018) but the majority of individuals surveyed reported 
never using the internet through any device (Figure 5).20 Moreover, internet use is heavily 
skewed towards urban, young, and male citizens (Wittels and Maybanks 2016: 6). Indeed, 
while 21 per cent of men reported having access to the internet in Sierra Leone in 2015, only 
10 per cent of women did (Wittels and Maybanks 2016: 35). 
 
Figure 5 ‘How often do you use the internet?’ 
 
Data source: Afrobarometer 2016/2018  
 
 
Fourth, where tax information is shared in English and in written form, it is unlikely to be 
meaningful to taxpayers owing to low levels of English literacy and fluency. In Sierra Leone 
and Ghana, taxpayers and civil society organisations highlighted the issue of the 
comprehensibility of data shared by governments, which is predominately shared in English 
only. Sierra Leone has an adult literacy rate of 32 per cent (World Bank 2016), while more 
than a third of survey participants in Sierra Leone received no formal schooling or only 
informal schooling, and more than half (57 per cent) did not complete secondary school. On 
account of low levels of English literacy and limited national access to the internet, a civil 
society representative argued that information published online in English ‘is not “public”’ 
information.21 As one official from the Ghanaian Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development phrased it, ‘If you want to hide something from a Ghanaian, write it down.’22  
 
In some areas, government officials made concerted efforts to communicate information in 
more accessible ways for local populations. As described by a local government official in 
Freetown, community outreach efforts centred on strategies that ensured information was 
conveyed in a citizen’s own language, in part because most people do not have access to 
television and radio. Accordingly, he noted, ‘When we visit these communities, we go house 
 
18 This is often because tax agents are often forced to use their own details when taxpayers do not have an email address 
or phone number. 
19 Sierra Leone interview #8. 
20 N 2,400 in Ghana and 1,200 in Sierra Leone. In the figure, ‘Don’t know’ responses are excluded, which represented 0.4 
and 1.8 per cent of responses in Ghana and Sierra Leone, respectively. 
21 Sierra Leone interview #14. 
22 Ghana interview #5.  
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to house to try to talk with people in the language that they understand […] house to house 
engagement with people [is what’s important].’23 Evidently, however, this is a costly and time-
intensive approach to sharing information that is unable to easily be sustained or replicated. 
Critically, where they are not effective at reaching citizens, tax education programmes can 
backfire and become a source of resentment among taxpayers, as with some Sierra 
Leonean citizens who viewed taxpayer sensitisation billboards as a highly visible waste of 
money.24  
 
How can information be shared in a more meaningful way with taxpayers? Our research 
makes clear that tax education programmes are most effective when they allow for 
interactive forums of information sharing and engagement with government officials. As 
described by the Information, Education, and Communications Officer of Freetown City 
Council, taxpayer education is not just about providing information, but also about 
encouraging taxpayers to engage with government: 
 
When [we] collect the taxes, [we] go to the radio and television and the public and tell 
the people, we want to collect this tax, and this is what we are going to use it for. By 
doing so, the people will become aware about the tax they pay, how much has been 
collected, and the development that came from the tax, how that money was spent. So 
basically, we go on the radio to try to tell people that they have access to information, 
that citizens have the right to come ask for information with regard to taxes.25 
 
More effective information sharing can also be a starting point enabling citizen demands for 
greater reciprocity – and, indeed, local governments and tax authorities identified these 
platforms as important mechanisms for securing feedback from citizens. Three channels may 
be particularly important for the government to share information in a more interactive way. 
 
First, taxpayers view local radio as a particularly effective form of communication (Figure 6). 
This is unsurprising as radio is the dominant mass-medium in Africa, reaching further than 
newspapers and television, both in terms of audience numbers and geographical reach 
(Manyozo 2011). Radio remains the most accessible broadcast platform in both countries. 
For example, in Sierra Leone in 2015, 81 per cent of adults had access to a radio and 69 per 
cent of households owned a radio, while radio was the only traditional media platform that 
achieved near gender equity of access (Wittels and Maybanks 2016: 7-8). At the same time, 
radio is particularly effective in reaching rural citizens as it offers an opportunity to 
communicate in local languages, while circumnavigating the underlying issues of limited 
electricity, low internet coverage, low literacy and the lack of population density outside of 
major cities. In order to call or text in, the only criteria are to be able to speak the local 
language and have a phone. 
 
  
 
23 Sierra Leone interview #40. 
24 This was expressed, for example, in Sierra Leone FGD #9. 
25 Sierra Leone interview #40.  
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Figure 6 Viable channels for interacting with taxpayers26 
 
 
Radio shows are particularly valued where they allow for meaningful interaction with 
government officials, through questions and dialogue, while allowing for citizens to remain 
anonymous, thus addressing the uneven power dynamics that often make it unappealing for 
citizens to engage in tax debates. Weekly call-in shows featuring government officials were 
part of the communication strategy of every local government we visited in Ghana, while also 
being used at the national level and by some local governments in Sierra Leone. In Makeni, 
for instance, the Chief Administrator of the City Council explained that the weekly radio 
programme ‘Council Hour’ has been critical to communicating with taxpayers, while taxpayer 
feedback and questions have even enabled him to identify cases of fraud and corruption on 
the part of his tax collectors, allowing him to directly address taxpayer concerns.27 Civil 
society representatives made it clear that greater radio coverage would help improve 
taxpayer knowledge, including about their rights, methods of demanding information, and 
procedures for paying taxes.28  
 
Despite the potential of radio programming, there remains scope to make the programming 
more effective by ensuring reliable and sustainable funding, particularly in Sierra Leone, 
where local governments were often unable to sustain weekly radio programmes.29 Further, 
there is some need to provide programming that is more explicitly focused on tax and that 
fosters tax discussions and shares tax information in an accessible way, as described earlier. 
More critically, the reach of radio is still limited for some low-income and marginalised 
groups, particularly in rural areas, while the structure of community radio, given its often 
 
26 On the left, the following options were removed for having less than 3 per cent: phone, secret society, religious 
institution, university, and informal small gatherings. On the right, the following options were removed for having less 
than 3 per cent: educational presentation, SMS, WhatsApp, secret society, and local school. For both, multiple 
responses were permitted. 
27 Sierra Leone interview #22. 
28 Sierra Leone interview #18. 
29 Sierra Leone interview #8. 
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limited capacity and susceptibility to politicisation, can cause taxpayers to doubt the 
credibility of the information being shared.30 Recognising that not everyone, including farmers 
who spend their days in their fields, can listen to the radio, some councils in Sierra Leone – 
including in Kono, Bombali, and Koinadugu – use ‘mobile sensitisation teams’ or ‘publicity’ 
vehicles, which involve using a public announcement system on a truck to access more 
remote communities, spreading information to taxpayers or playing tax ‘jingles’.31 While these 
methods may allow for broader coverage, they evidently do not allow for taxpayer interaction. 
 
Second, citizens also reported that television is a useful means through which they can 
receive information from government, as well as interact with government officials in some 
way. Ultimately, radio and television serve slightly different roles at national and local levels. 
At the local level, they both offer an efficient means of citizen engagement with local officials 
among a population that is, to a large extent, illiterate and hard to reach. At the national level, 
conversely, radio and television can be useful as a means of broader political accountability. 
For example, in Ghana, readings of the national budget have been televised, as have public 
corruption hearings conducted by the Public Accounts Committee.32 Respondents viewed 
both as positive and meaningful forms of transparency and accountability. For the first time, 
citizens explained, they were given a sense of the larger picture of how money is being spent 
nationally, through the budget reading (i.e. more transparency). In addition, the public 
hearings relating to members of government charged with corruption demonstrated that 
government can and will hold itself accountable for misappropriation of public funds (i.e. 
more accountability).33  
 
Finally, there is significant popular demand for community meetings to discuss revenue and 
expenditure issues, with evidence that such meetings are particularly successful when 
accompanied by additional space for training and dialogue. For instance, a World Bank study 
from Burundi captures the importance of achieving a two-way exchange of information in 
order to ensure that transparency is meaningful (World Bank 2014). In this context, in order 
to address issues of access and comprehensibility, municipal administrations worked with 
local civil society organisations to disseminate information and converse with taxpayers in 
spaces like church and community meetings, providing a wider reach and a two-way 
engagement with taxpayers. In our cases, civil society actors could usefully play similar roles 
to make forums more inclusive and accessible for taxpayers. This is evident, for example, in 
Sierra Leone, where bimonthly council meetings are often only attended by civil society 
representatives, as these forums are perceived to be ‘for the more educated’ rather than for 
‘regular’ taxpayers.34 Accordingly, civil society actors may usefully play a role to make forums 
more inclusive for taxpayers while also equipping them with the tools they need to feel 
confident in engaging with government.  
 
The case study evidence points very clearly towards the weaknesses of existing 
transparency initiatives, the limitations of published information for reaching taxpayers, and 
the comparative importance of interactive forums as a key means of reaching taxpayers with 
meaningful information. Further, our research points to the role that civil society can play in 
translating information for taxpayers – both literally translating information into local 
languages and translating complex legal and tax jargon into plain language – and playing an 
intermediary role to support taxpayer engagement with government through interactive 
 
30 Sierra Leone interview #16. 
31 Sierra Leone interviews #22 and 31. 
32 The Public Accounts Committee is a parliamentary committee to whom the Auditor-General reports. This committee is 
charged with investigating corruption and financial malfeasance on the part of government officials as recommended by 
the Auditor-General.  
33 Although this public investigation into corruption charges of government officials has caused some cynicism among 
citizens, it represents a positive link between tax and accountability. At the same time, however, in some contexts, such 
national viewings risk being perceived as political and undermining perceptions of the overall tax system. 
34 Sierra Leone interview #23. 
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forums. These findings drive home a key point – taxpayers do not want to simply be told 
information but want the opportunity to better understand the information that is being 
presented, to ask questions, and to engage with government officials in a safe and sincere 
manner. 
 
 
3  Strengthening taxpayer engagement 
 
In order for enhanced transparency to result in meaningful tax-accountability linkages, there 
needs to be constructive public engagement around taxation. Transparency and taxpayer 
engagement go hand in hand and the appropriate strategies may involve considerable 
overlap: the primary goal of transparency is to underpin and encourage more constructive 
engagement around taxation. That is, it is intended to provide information that can enable 
taxpayers to participate in debates about taxation, to oversee the use of tax revenues and to 
make reciprocal demands on government for public benefits from taxation. Thus, 
transparency is insufficient on its own, but needs to be coupled with explicit strategies to 
empower taxpayers to use that information to engage with government.  
 
Existing research suggests that tax bargaining may be encouraged through measures to 
facilitate and support collective action (see e.g. Prichard 2015). On the supply side, 
policymakers and stakeholders could create new forums, or reform existing forums, to 
provide institutionalised spaces for taxpayers to engage with governments, such as town hall 
meetings, call-in radio shows, or even participatory budget processes. On the demand side, 
while it may be difficult for individual taxpayers to make effective demands on government, 
citizens can leverage civil society organisations to channel collective grievances. Taxpayer 
empowerment depends on changes on both the supply and demand side in order to foster 
meaningful engagement.  
 
While the broad direction of needed reforms is clear, the kind of recommendations commonly 
made by analysts lack the specificity to be directly useful to governments and donors. They 
also risk underestimating the complexity of supporting broader engagement on tax issues, 
which have historically been dominated by experts and relatively hidden from public view. 
We deepen existing analyses by first considering the nature of existing citizen engagement 
around tax issues and then considering how taxpayer engagement may be strengthened by 
supporting safe, secure, and sincere forums of engagement and bringing in support from 
trusted community and civil society actors.  
 
3.1 The state of taxpayer engagement in Sierra Leone and Ghana 
 
Citizens are often assumed to be largely disengaged from tax issues on account of the often 
complex and technical nature of taxation, which leads engagement on tax issues to remain 
the purview of ‘experts’ only (see e.g. Prichard 2018, Sharp, Sweet and Rocha Menocal 
2019). This is true to some extent in Sierra Leone and Ghana, with relatively low levels of 
interaction with government officials and minimal engagement in collective action around tax 
issues. However, evidence also suggests a willingness and desire to engage in local public 
forums, with growing civil society capacity to encourage popular engagement. Nevertheless, 
capacity to engage with tax issues is uneven and gendered, appearing to be influenced in 
particular by level of education.  
 
First, we find that 26 and 47 per cent of respondents in Ghana, and Sierra Leone, 
respectively, had individually sought out public officials to discuss tax matters, while 38 and 
56 per cent of respondents in Ghana and Sierra Leone, respectively, reported having 
attended a voluntary public meeting dealing with tax issues. While not all taxpayers have 
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engaged directly with tax issues, the proportion who have is substantial. Nevertheless, our 
evidence shows that engagement with tax issues is largely localised: in both countries those 
who had contacted public officials on their own initiative overwhelmingly had done so at the 
local level. In Sierra Leone, this was more often traditional authorities (chiefs and village 
headmen/women) rather than formal state officials (Figure 7).35  
 
Figure 7 Percentage of respondents who contacted a public official, by actor  
  
 
Second, the majority of individuals in each case (80 per cent in Sierra Leone and 78 per cent 
in Ghana) reported that public forums are a useful platform for understanding the processes 
of, and reasons for taxation. In turn, the majority of individuals who felt that such forums are 
useful had an appetite for them to be held once a month or more frequently (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 Desired frequency of public forums36 
 
 
In some contexts, these forums were seen as important ways to influence local policymaking; 
as explained by one group of taxpayers participating in a focus group discussion in Sierra 
Leone, ‘We came to understand that communities that complain about lack of services in 
their localities during radio discussions were awarded projects such as culverts, garbage 
dumping sites, and rehabilitation feeder roads.’37 Accordingly, much engagement through 
forums like radio shows has been explicitly aimed at improving accountability in the use of 
tax revenues. As described by a focus group participant in Bo: 
 
For years now we have been paying our respective taxes to council, but they have 
done very little to improve our community in terms of service delivery. They have not 
been able to account for revenues they collect. This has made us to make calls and 
make text messages [sic] during radio discussion programmes.38  
 
 
35 This localised engagement is unsurprising and in line with research that highlights the greater levels of trust that 
individuals have in local officials (see e.g. Bratton 2012).  
36 N=786 in Ghana and N=1,756 in Sierra Leone. 
37 Sierra Leone focus group discussion (FGD) #13. 
38 Sierra Leone FGD #6.  
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In Ghana, mandatory town hall meetings play a particularly important role in enabling 
discussions of taxation and spending. Importantly, these meetings are inclusive, as they are 
conducted in local dialects and offer citizens an opportunity to raise concerns and ask 
questions. Respondents reported that they are particularly effective when they are 
complemented by training by local CSOs on matters like participatory budgeting 
mechanisms. Often the goal of citizen training, beyond arming citizens with some technical 
ability to understand tax and budget information, is also to help citizens gain confidence in 
being able to speak up at town hall meetings.39 Evidence suggests that when training has 
been combined with fiscal transparency in neutral forums where both citizens and 
government officials are present, trust and engagement have been strengthened (CHF 
2010). It should be kept in mind, however, that additional efforts must be made to incorporate 
marginalised groups, such as (less educated) women and youth. For example, in a Sekondi-
Takoradi focus group in Ghana, female market traders had no awareness about local town 
hall meetings.40 
 
Third, only a small proportion of respondents engaged with tax issues through collective 
action or protest movements. In Sierra Leone, the vast majority of focus group respondents 
say they would never consider being involved in a public protest or demonstration. For 
instance, in a focus group discussion with business owners in Kabala, respondents said that 
they would never protest because they were afraid of the possible negative repercussions, 
including getting arrested or imprisoned.41 One participant stated that if people protest others 
will think of them as ‘anti-government campaigners’; because of the ‘politically-sensitive 
context’ of their city, he would therefore ‘not think of doing such for fear of the negative 
backlash [he] would suffer, especially from pro-government supporters in [his] area’.42 This 
reflects both fear of potential reprisals for participation in protests and a sense that protests 
are not an effective means of engaging with or putting pressure on governments. Some 
individuals explained that this nervousness about protests was the result of ‘memories of 
war’ and the challenges of post-conflict spaces.43  
 
More broadly, around the time of data collection and in the lead-up to the 2018 national 
elections, there was a growing climate of fear and intimidation surrounding public opposition. 
Government actions to limit protest and press freedom were reported by civil society 
representatives to have had significant impacts on civil society and public morale.44 
According to a civil society representative of an international NGO based in Freetown, ‘The 
civil society space is now tighter. Organisations that used to be vocal are now being 
sycophants for fear of being intimidated.’45 As described by a representative of the Open Tax 
Initiative, the state has made significant moves to ‘disallow protests’ leading to a ‘bad 
situation’ wherein any ‘criticism is tagged as anti-government’, creating ‘political risks’ for 
moving forward with protests or deeper engagement.46 Previous research in border regions 
of Sierra Leone shows that participation in civic organisations can make individuals a target 
of higher informal levies and inappropriate behaviour on the part of revenue officials (van den 
Boogaard, Prichard, and Jibao 2018), suggesting that people see a risk in being more 
 
39 Ghana interview #5. 
40 Ghana FGDs #4, 5. 
41 Sierra Leone FGD #9. 
42 Sierra Leone FGD #9. 
43 Sierra Leone interview #16. 
44 Sierra Leone interviews #18 and #15. For instance, President Koroma promised, but failed, to repeal Public Order Act 
65, which was passed in the politically tumultuous post-independence years and continues to give broad state power to 
restrict freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, including peaceful protests, and freedom of association (Articles 26 
and 27, Government of Sierra Leone 1965).  
45 Sierra Leone interview #15 
46 Sierra Leone interview #18. Similarly, Inveen (2016) explains that from 2014 to 2016, ‘the country’s ruling party has 
shown a worsening, often violent intolerance for public criticism, and with an 11-year civil war in the rear-view mirror, a 
culture of silence often deters would-be protesters from publicly airing their grievances’.  
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engaged. This has all resulted in a context wherein, as described by a focus group 
participant in the East ward of Freetown, people are ‘afraid to express [themselves], to 
protest’.47   
 
By contrast, Ghana has a long history of popular protest, organised around dissatisfaction 
with high costs of living, dispossession and inadequate infrastructure, participatory 
governance, corruption, working conditions, and unemployment (Asante and Helbrecht 
2018). Aboagye and Hillbom (2020) describe how taxpayers have negotiated with the state 
through the nation’s history ‘to limit the extent of taxation, especially in cases where state 
reciprocity falls short of what people expect’, whether through misappropriation or 
mismanagement of tax revenues or outright corruption (see also Prichard 2015). This has 
particularly been the case since the return to democratic rule in 1992, which opened up 
greater space for public dissent and meant that the state had to rely to a greater extent on 
consensual and quasi-voluntary tax collection (Aboagye and Hillbom 2020). Most 
prominently in recent memory, public outcry and street demonstrations against the 
introduction of VAT in 1995 eventually led to the repeal of the tax (see e.g. Akufo-Addo 1995; 
Wereko-Brobby 1995; Osei 2000). Nevertheless, focus group respondents did not report 
engaging in tax protests or mobilisations, illustrating that even in contexts where public 
mobilisation is more feasible, citizens rarely engage in this way with tax issues.  
 
Finally, despite visible protests being relatively rare, some civil society groups have been 
active in engaging with the government over tax issues in other ways. In Ghana, focus group 
participants highlighted how civil society groups, including community-based organisations 
such as youth associations, have acted as pressure groups to hold local governments to 
account.48 Nationally, one of the best known examples is OccupyGhana, which has worked 
with both the media and the judicial system to ensure ‘that the Government and all public 
servants who make use of taxpayers’ money must not be corrupt… [and are] transparent, 
accountable, and open to scrutiny’ (OccupyGhana n.d.). While less well developed in Sierra 
Leone, CSOs have likewise been engaged with tax issues, though on a more localised level. 
Focus group respondents particularly noted that civil society can play a useful role in helping 
taxpayers understand how tax revenues are used. Further, civil society representatives 
highlighted a handful of times that coalitions of civil society organisations at the local level 
have put pressure on local governments for greater transparency.49 
 
Underlying these dynamics of engagement are stark inequities in the ability of groups to 
engage with tax issues, affected by, among other factors, education and gender. For 
example, focus group participants in Takoradi, Ghana represented a range of socioeconomic 
groups and education levels. More educated participants were more knowledgeable about 
the taxes they paid and more vocal about the challenges they faced, while also being better 
equipped with information about where to turn for information on taxation. By contrast, less 
educated participants, including predominantly female market traders, were unable to 
provide basic information about the taxes they pay or to identify channels of information.50 
These observations are in line with Kangave and Katusiimeh (2015), who found that in 
Uganda the technical nature of taxation restricted engagement in the tax reform processes to 
a limited group of actors with sufficient capability and capacity.  
 
  
 
47 Sierra Leone FGD #19. 
48 Ghana FGD #14. 
49 Sierra Leone interviews #5, 7, 15 and 19. 
50 Ghana FGD #4. 
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3.2 Improving forums for taxpayer engagement 
 
The overall picture painted so far is one in which taxpayers have relatively limited access to 
information, limited pathways for engagement with government, only relatively rarely engage 
directly with those responsible for revenue and spending, and have only limited confidence in 
the efficacy of engagement efforts. Nevertheless, some forums for engagement have been 
comparatively effective, and taxpayers shared further ideas as to how they could be 
improved. The data presents promising avenues for strengthening taxpayer engagement by 
supporting (1) safe, secure, and sincere forums for engagement, (2) allies whom taxpayers 
trust, and (3) a role for civil society to act as translators, enablers, and trainers. 
 
3.2.1 Supporting safe, secure, and sincere forums for engagement 
 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of different forums of engagement will depend on 
contextual histories, the nature of the actors involved, and the trust that taxpayers have in 
state actors. Despite this need for a deep understanding of the local context, our research 
points to two general characteristics that underpin the effectiveness of forums for 
engagement. First, and fundamentally, citizens need to perceive that forums for engagement 
are safe and secure spaces, with government actors sincerely engaged in discussion and 
willing to be responsive to citizen demands. Even where forums and pathways for 
engagement exist, taxpayers are often relatively reluctant to engage. A prominent factor 
contributing to this lack of engagement is a sense of vulnerability, and perceptions of a high 
risk of reprisal in response for speaking out about tax and accountability issues. As 
described, in Sierra Leone there is a deep reluctance to participate in public protest for fear 
of potential consequences. This, in turn, appears to extend to the role of formal government 
forums, where a lack of anonymity made many respondents reluctant to participate – aside 
from the broader difficulties many people have in attending in-person meetings. It is this 
concern about anonymity that figures centrally in overwhelming popular support for radio call-
in shows, and other online forums, which allow for anonymous engagement (see Figure 6 
above).  
 
Second, citizens must perceive forums of engagement to be meaningful, with the possibility 
of resulting in genuine policy reform. Alongside perceived risks of engaging publicly in 
debates about taxation, taxpayers frequently expressed the view that engagement was likely 
to be futile and was therefore not likely to be useful. As described by a focus group 
participant in Freetown, ‘[Greater engagement] would be futile, so no one wants to 
complain.’51 This sense of futility is linked to several key indicators. The majority of taxpayers 
in both cases feel that the central government never listens to what people say or what they 
need, and more than a third feel the same about the local government, while taxpayers have 
low levels of confidence in their ability to influence unjust policies (Figure 9). 
 
  
 
51 Sierra Leone FGD #19. 
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Figure 9 Perceptions of government responsiveness 
 
 
The lack of perceived responsiveness to citizen demands is compounded by widespread 
beliefs that only political elites and traditional authorities have influence over government 
decision making (Figure 10). This is in line with M’Bayo (2016), who argues that debates 
about taxation in Sierra Leone are largely between elites in Freetown, and are highly 
politicised, with general taxpayers – and especially those in the provinces – left out.  
 
Figure 10 Perceptions of influential actors52  
 
 
While this sense of the futility of engagement is common in contexts of low state trust, 
evidence suggests that it is possible to foster more productive state-society relations. As a 
result of mandatory local town hall meetings in Ghana, and with support from the Ministry of 
Finance’s Fiscal Decentralization Unit and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
 
52 Market traders, local landowners, and international NGOs are not displayed in the local government section of the figure 
as they received less than 2 per cent of responses. Market traders, international NGOs, and ‘no one’ are likewise not 
displayed in the central government section of the figure as they received less than 2 per cent of responses. 
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Development’s Social Accountability Unit, simplified budget templates and guidelines have 
been developed for explaining to citizens about budgets and how money is used. These 
simplified templates call for pictorial representations of approved, ongoing, or completed 
projects, highlighting both the project budget and the source of funding. This example is 
suggestive of the ways in which relatively minor changes – delivering more meaningful 
information to taxpayers, engaging in dialogue, responding to at least some taxpayer 
concerns – can substantially shift the potential for taxpayer engagement. Elsewhere, 
research has likewise found that when the state has demonstrated a willingness to sincerely 
engage with citizens, citizens have more positive perspectives of the government and are, in 
turn, more likely to participate in governance forums.53 While trust in government may only 
improve over the long run, strategies to encourage inclusion, to ensure a non-threatening 
environment, and to demonstrate an openness to criticism and dialogue appear critical to 
shifting political scepticism of the potential for engagement. 
 
3.2.2 Working with trusted community allies 
 
Working with trusted community allies – including traditional authorities, religious leaders or 
other community leaders – can help overcome barriers to engagement related to a lack of 
information, a lack of perceived security and limited belief in the utility of engagement. 
Alternative sources of local authority often enjoy significant legitimacy among taxpayers and 
can correspondingly be powerful and effective conduits for spreading information and 
persuading taxpayers that engagement is both safe and warranted. This is particularly the 
case in contexts where taxpayers have low trust in, or negative perceptions of, the state.  
 
While the relative importance of different actors will vary according to context, four broad 
types of community allies may play particularly important roles. First, in environments where 
traditional authorities retain considerable power and legitimacy, they may represent natural 
intermediaries between communities and the state. For example, chiefs play this critical role 
and also engage in revenue mobilisation on behalf of the state in Sierra Leone, where, unlike 
in Ghana, chiefs’ power was further entrenched in the post-colonial period (see e.g. 
Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2014, Rathbone 1999, Fanthorpe 2001).54 
A local government official in Freetown emphasised the important role that chiefs can play 
not only in raising revenue, but also in shaping engagement around taxation and advocating 
on behalf of taxpayers: 
 
The chiefs […] are very important […] you know, they can be the ones that people 
communicate through, because they are the most respected people in the community. 
Since the chief serves as an authority, people don’t joke with this […] they [the chiefs] 
work hand in hand [with the community] to make sure that the tax revenues are going 
to the right place, while also monitoring development projects… Over and again the 
chiefs have raised awareness – for example, if for a long time people pay taxes and 
don’t see any development, then they [the chiefs] can try to engage the government, 
saying that ‘we’ve paid our taxes and we don’t see anything yet’ – you know, that’s one 
of the means of accountability.55 
 
In some areas, relationships between the local councils and chiefs are conflictual (see e.g. 
van den Boogaard 2020, Henn 2018), though in other areas the council uses chiefs as ‘a 
 
53 In Burundi, for example, when public forums involved primarily one-way communication of information to taxpayers, and 
were perceived to be both pro forma and to serve a political purpose, the meetings were perceived as a waste of time 
for the citizens, which also generated a broader sense that engaging with the government was meaningless (World 
Bank 2014). By contrast, when some local governments began to provide information that was more meaningful to 
citizens, allowed greater space for engagement and discussion, and made some efforts to be responsive, public 
perceptions of the government (and willingness to participate) were transformed.  
54 Sierra Leone interview #17. 
55 Sierra Leone interview #40.  
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liaison between the community and [the government]’ to help with tax education and 
collection.56 Given this role, it is unsurprising that more than a third of respondents in Sierra 
Leone reported that when they have an issue with a tax official or tax collector, they go or 
would go to a traditional authority to help them resolve the issue (Figure 11).57 Along with 
local governments, in Sierra Leone taxpayers also saw an important role for chiefs in hosting 
public forums about taxation (Figure 12). By contrast, in Ghana, where the role of traditional 
authorities has been curtailed, particularly since the 1992 constitution, it is unsurprising that 
taxpayers view the potential role of chiefs as less important. Where they retain local power 
and legitimacy, there may be good reason to engage traditional authorities as intermediaries 
of taxpayer engagement. Nevertheless, as chiefs may support taxpayer engagement in some 
contexts and serve as an obstacle to stronger citizen-state relations in other contexts (see 
e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2014; Boone 2003; Labonte 2012; Logan 2008; Lund 2006; van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; Roopnarine 2014), this intermediary role should be 
approached cautiously. 
 
Figure 11 ‘When you have an issue with a tax collector/tax official, who would you go 
to in order to resolve it?’ 
  
 
  
 
56 Sierra Leone interview #24. 
57  Note that the following responses were excluded from the visualisation as they had fewer than 1 per cent of 
respondents identify them in both Sierra Leone and Ghana: local businesses, business associations, local associations, 
local CSOs/NGOs, international NGOs, newspapers, social media, WhatsApp groups, call a community meeting, local 
landowners, commercial business elites.  
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Figure 12 ‘Which actors should host public forums about tax issues?’58  
 
Second, trade unions and business associations may represent effective allies for 
engagement, particularly as these groups often have a natural interest in tax issues and, in 
principle, broad popular constituencies. Research elsewhere has demonstrated the potential 
for business and trade associations to act as catalysts for tax bargaining, though also 
highlights some risks associated with representation and cooptation of association leaders 
(Gloppen and Rakner 2002; Prichard 2015; Joshi and Ayee 2008). In our case studies, there 
is some evidence of business associations negotiating tax rates, sharing tax information, 
strengthening relations between traders and the government, and otherwise acting as tax 
intermediaries on behalf of their members. For example, a Traders’ Union Chairman in Sierra 
Leone described:  
 
Sometimes, I tell council to reduce taxes and they listen. Council fixes their prices and 
we negotiate. I always argue that different shops have different shapes and content 
and therefore the prices must vary. I also tell them that the business atmosphere can 
change and that some businesses may fall, so that [hardship] should be considered in 
terms of pricing and the time stipulated for payment.59  
 
Associations can also help to promote transparency and tax sensitisation within their 
membership. For example, local government officials in Makeni, Sierra Leone noted that 
union heads assisted with tax sensitisation and education, providing information to their 
membership about how revenues are being used by the local government.60  
 
These findings, however, should be received with caution as engaging with business 
associations and labour unions is complex, presenting potential risks for representation and 
equity outcomes. Associations may not well represent the interests of their membership, 
while power dynamics within them can reinforce socioeconomic and gendered inequities 
(Joshi and Ayee 2008; Meagher 2016; Prichard and van den Boogaard 2017). In Sierra 
Leone, business associations have been relatively focused on negotiating tax rates, though 
less successful in supporting broader engagement and demand making, while some union 
leaders appear to have pursued comparatively narrow interests. For instance, the Makeni 
City Council Chief Administrator explained that the Drivers’ Union decided to collaborate with 
 
58 N=786 in Ghana and N=1,756 in Sierra Leone. Note that the following responses were excluded from the visualisation 
as they had fewer than 1 per cent of respondents identify them in both Sierra Leone and Ghana: Local NGOs/CSOs, 
international NGOs/CSOs, international donors, public service, schoolteachers. 
59 Sierra Leone interview #51. 
60 Sierra Leone interview #23. 
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the council to collect taxes because it wanted to exert its authority over its members.61 
Meanwhile, in Ghana focus group participants consistently noted that trade associations are 
not a useful avenue for finding out more about how tax revenues are spent,62 while there is 
little evidence that business associations influence tax-accountability debates in this context. 
The challenge for policymakers is thus to identify how best to encourage, broaden and 
strengthen engagement by business associations while prioritising equity considerations. 
 
Third, community organisations – including youth groups and women’s associations – may 
be effectively targeted to ensure the inclusivity of taxpayer engagement initiatives. For 
example, in Sierra Leone, a civil society programme led by Plan USA targeted youth 
stakeholders that were previously excluded and disengaged from tax and governance 
processes. Through youth engagement, outreach, and training, the project successfully 
encouraged tax compliance and broader engagement in the tax collection process (Avis 
2015). In Ghana, community-based advocacy groups have increasingly mobilised citizens. 
Youth associations have begun to function as pressure groups to hold local governments 
accountable, engaging in stakeholder meetings with local government representatives.63 This 
experience highlights the need to actively support engagement of traditionally marginalised 
groups, providing support for community-based organisations and providing space for the 
formation of credible partnerships. 
 
Finally, as discussed above, the media can play an important role in providing information, 
and crystallising and mobilising popular concerns around taxation. In Ghana, for example, 
Prichard (2015) highlights the role of the Committee for Joint Action in organising mass 
mobilisation and demands for reciprocity for tax payments. This suggests that one important 
goal, particularly in less democratic settings, may be to encourage shifts in media portrayals 
of taxation, emphasising reciprocity rather than only taxpayer obligations.64  
 
3.2.3 Civil society as translators, enablers, and trainers 
 
While civil society may, in unique cases, lead to large-scale protests and bargaining related 
to taxation (see e.g. Prichard 2015; Sempere 2018), our research suggests that in most 
contexts the most effective roles for civil society are as translators, enablers, and trainers in 
facilitating dialogue and engagement. While there is an important role to be played by large 
advocacy networks with targeted expertise in pressuring government for greater 
accountability around taxation, the reality may be that successful tax-accountability outcomes 
may have limited reach beyond a narrow constituency of activists.  Rather than trying to 
broaden support for tax reforms, it may be more impactful to ‘localise’ tax advocacy efforts to 
make tax issues more salient to the majority of taxpayers (Sempere 2018). Civil society may 
support such localisation through three key channels.  
 
First, civil society can play a key role as translators of tax information, making the issues 
intelligible to everyday citizens and enabling taxpayers to engage with issues from which 
they have historically been excluded. This role can mean literally translating tax information 
provided by governments into local languages, but also making messages more accessible 
and audio-based for those with limited education. For example, in Sierra Leone BAN has 
begun making revenue information accessible in local languages, as well as turning the 
content into short videos that can be shared via social media.65 
 
61 Sierra Leone interview #47. 
62 Ghana FGDs #1-26. 
63 Ghana FGD #14. 
64 Consistent with such a story, Prichard (2015) reports that in less democratic Ethiopia taxes are more likely to be 
understood in terms of the responsibility of taxpayers to comply, while taxpayers appeared to have weaker expectations 
of reciprocity for those payments. 
65 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
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Second, civil society can play an important role in facilitating forums for engagement and 
enabling citizen participation. As described above, local leaders and community-based actors 
may be particularly important trusted intermediaries for tax-related discussions and may thus 
be particularly effective at mediation or facilitation. In Sierra Leone, the Enhancing the 
Interaction between Citizens and the State in Sierra Leone (ENCISS) programme used a 
range of tools to enable state-citizen engagement, including training on budgeting, budget 
priority games, community and municipal meetings and dialogues, as well as radio 
programmes. Most critically, these efforts to encourage direct citizen participation were 
coupled with attempts to persuade state actors to expand their communications and news 
related to the implementation of development projects. This combination of strategies 
empowered citizens, while also creating platforms for communication and constructive 
discussion between state actors and citizens. Christian Aid attributes the success of the 
programme to the fact that citizens became more aware of the link between taxes and 
expenditure and felt that their government was more open and responsive, thus encouraging 
progressive engagement (Christian Aid 2015).  
 
Third, civil society can provide training to enable broader taxpayer engagement and to shift 
the power dynamics of engagement. This may involve equipping citizens with a clearer 
understanding of both the legal avenues for engagement and the types of legal demands that 
they would be empowered to make (see e.g. Christian Aid 2015). For example, Citizen 
Budget Watch in Sierra Leone has taken efforts to encourage community participation in 
budget processes by training budget monitors in districts and communities.66 Similarly, BAN 
has been engaged in training citizens to engage with local governments on issues of 
taxation. As described by a representative of BAN, ‘We provided them [citizens] in terms of 
what are the issues or what are the parameters you should look for to know whether the tax 
estimate that the council said they are going to collect is correct.’67 After going through this 
training, members of the Western Area Budget Education Advocacy Network estimated the 
amount of tax that should have been collected and found that the government figure was 
80,000,000 Leones (about US$8,000) below this target. This exercise enabled citizens to 
question the tax estimates being given by the council, engaging extensively with them to limit 
revenue leakages, ultimately resulting in a higher government figure.68  
 
In Ghana, civil society groups have likewise played an important role in training citizens, and 
equipping them with the tools they need, to engage in taxation at a larger scale, reflecting the 
comparative strength of Ghanaian civil society. For example, the STAR (Strengthening 
Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness) initiative in Ghana coordinates grants to 
local CSOs to help them implement transparency and accountability programming at the 
local level.69 Some partners have conducted pre-budgeting surveys among citizens in their 
communities and used funding and technical support from STAR-Ghana. Further, through 
another programme, the IncluCity programme, joint trainings including both citizens and 
governments increased understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities and 
increased trust between them (Lamberson, Adams and Arsenault 2016). In Ghana, these 
joint trainings have strengthened the effectiveness of the legally-required town hall forums by 
supporting the emergence of an informed and engaged citizenry.70 According to a Project 
Director with the IncluCity programme, citizens in areas that received training are now much 
more capable of reading budgets, understanding statements of accounts, and understanding 
 
66 Sierra Leone interview #7. 
67 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
68 Sierra Leone interview #5. 
69 STAR Ghana is managed by a consortium of development agencies including Christian Aid with Mango, the Overseas 
Development Institute, Social Development Direct, Nkum Associates and On Our Radar. Local civil society 
organisations in Ghana apply to the consortium for funding for initiatives related to transparency and accountability in 
their communities. 
70 Ghana interview #5. 
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and participating in the planning process.71 By creating greater trust, these trainings have 
helped citizens to gain confidence in being able to speak up at town hall meetings, 
overcoming the sense of fear and futility that has tended to limit engagement.72  
 
 
4  Challenges to achieving meaningful tax 
transparency and strengthening taxpayer 
engagement   
 
Evidence from our case studies points towards relatively clear strategies for expanding and 
deepening transparency and strengthening taxpayer engagement. However, achieving these 
goals is challenging for a number of reasons, not least because greater transparency can 
just as easily reinforce mistrust as it can encourage productive tax bargaining. We highlight 
four key challenges to transparency and taxpayer engagement initiatives. First, funding and 
capacity constraints limit states’ commitments to taxpayer education and engagement. 
Second, even where resources exist, political constraints undermine the sincerity of state 
commitments to being more transparent and responsive to taxpayer demands. Third, the 
weakness of civil society limits the impact of local collective action and advocacy. Finally, 
given limited resources, particularly at sub-national levels, there is a challenge in managing 
popular expectations about what can reasonably be expected in return for relatively small tax 
payments. Underlying all of these challenges is a need for productive, credible, and sincere 
state-society exchanges in order to encourage and sustain greater taxpayer engagement 
and open possibilities for tax bargaining and accountability.  
  
4.1 State capacity constraints 
 
A basic challenge facing transparency and sensitisation initiatives is the lack of financial and 
human capacity on the part of governments.73 Funding taxpayer education and engagement 
initiatives is often not a priority for policymakers given scarce resources. In Ghana, for 
example, there is a broad sense that despite ambitious new legal mandates designed to 
expand transparency, the effectiveness of these initiatives may be eroded by the absence of 
sustainable funding. Government officials described that town hall meetings – mandated by 
law – are a drain on the assemblies’ resources. Town hall meetings require that chairs be 
rented, refreshments bought, and a sitting per diem paid to all ‘prominent’ stakeholders such 
as chiefs, assemblypersons, representatives from associations, and CSO representatives. 
For these reasons, many such meetings remain smaller than they should be for meaningful 
engagement.  
 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, local governments commonly struggle to host interactive 
community meetings, particularly in rural areas,74 and to pay for the radio programmes that 
are central to taxpayer education strategies.75 Indeed, several councils have been forced to 
cancel their radio engagement programmes due to a lack of funding, despite their popularity 
with taxpayers and local tax officials. In Kailahun District, for example, when donor funding 
for a weekly radio programme was withdrawn, the programme was cancelled. Despite 
widespread opinion that the programme had a positive impact, the council was not able to 
 
71 Ghana interview #1. 
72 Ghana interview #5. 
73 Sierra Leone interview #18. 
74 Sierra Leone interview #31. 
75 Variation in the weakness of local capacity also limits the coherence of taxpayer engagement strategies, with local 
governments having significantly different levels of capacity to engage with taxpayers. 
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fund the programme independently, despite the cost being relatively minimal (about US$35 a 
week).76  
 
In both contexts, many of the initiatives designed to support greater transparency and 
taxpayer engagement have tended to require external support, be it for training and taxpayer 
education, organising forums for engagement, or encouraging greater inclusivity of business 
associations. While these initiatives would ideally become more self-sustaining over time, in 
the shorter term, there appears to be significant scope for expanding targeted donor support 
for tax-related engagement. There are good reasons to think that such programmes can ‘pay 
for themselves’ in the longer term – that is, that revenue from increased tax compliance, and 
savings on tax enforcement, are likely to be greater than the cost of the programmes 
themselves. More research is needed to test this expectation, while governments need to be 
persuaded of these programmes’ value.  
 
4.2 Political constraints 
 
While the challenge of funding effective transparency initiatives is real, it may in some cases 
also disguise an underlying lack of political commitment to making information about revenue 
and spending more readily available and to inviting greater public engagement. This is 
unsurprising: transparency can lead to increased pressure on politicians and state officials 
where their performance is poor, exposing a political vulnerability, and can disrupt existing 
networks of patronage and rent seeking. As described by a Ghanaian national radio 
journalist, ‘There is the notion that when you are accountable and transparent, it can be 
useful for your political opponents and they will be able to make political capital out of it.’77 A 
key consequence in Ghana is that transparency is often supported only where it is likely to 
benefit the party in power, or at least not disrupt it. For example, the rapid expansion of legal 
requirements for transparency at the local level appears to be motivated not only by a desire 
to foster local accountability, but also to impose greater central government control on local 
authorities.78   
 
Where such initiatives disrupt rent-seeking networks, political commitment is often less 
forthcoming. For example, in Sierra Leone, efforts to implement a more transparent property 
tax platform were regularly stymied by political resistance. As described by a former official 
tasked with implementing the reforms: 
 
The system is very transparent, which is a political problem. [With the system in place] 
there is no easy way to do devious work; therefore, instead of working with the system, 
people work outside the system, they don’t want to use the system.79  
 
The same official explained that ‘the biggest problem is finding the political will to face 
transparency and accountability’ as ‘they [local government officials] don’t want to be 
transparent 100 per cent’.80  
 
One of the consequences of limited political support for transparency is that reform is often 
heavily dependent on a small group of committed officials, making it difficult to sustain. For 
example, positive developments in Makeni and Bo in Sierra Leone were widely attributed to 
local leadership, but were not sustained after these politicians and administrators left office.81 
In Makeni, a taxpayer engagement radio programme was only started after the ‘very vibrant’ 
 
76 Sierra Leone interviews #11 and #30. 
77 Ghana interview #8 
78 Ghana interview #5. 
79 Sierra Leone interview #21. 
80 Sierra Leone interview #21. 
81 Sierra Leone interviews #5, 12 and 16. 
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Chief Administrator (CA) was transferred from Bo, where he had already successfully started 
the programme.82 While an advantage to Makeni, Bo suffered from his departure. As 
described by a former official in Bo, when the CA left, the ‘ownership was not there in council’ 
to keep things going.83 A change in leadership dramatically disrupted the transparency that 
had been undertaken, with the actions of the new leadership interpreted by officials as being 
‘against transparency’. 84 As explained by a civil society representative in Sierra Leone, ‘it is 
the leadership’ that makes the difference: ‘When the leader is sincere and accountable, [you] 
can make [progress]. But when you are not transparent and accountable, you cannot.’85 
Given the necessity of political will and the challenges posed by a lack of it, there is a need 
for proponents of transparency to anticipate political reticence and, where possible, work to 
highlight the potentially positive benefits of transparency for those in power – most notably, to 
encourage quasi-voluntary tax compliance and broader trust in government – and to seek to 
institutionalise rights-based transparency practices and norms. 
 
4.3 Civil society capacity constraints 
 
While government may not have the political will to sincerely undertake transparency and 
engagement initiatives, the weakness of local civil society organisations limits pressure on 
government to do so. This weakness is exacerbated in contexts where government 
restrictions on civil society are considerable and politicised. As a civil society leader in Sierra 
Leone explained, ‘civil society [in Sierra Leone] is not strong [and] not well informed’, with a 
more general ‘difficulty organising people’.86 Instead of serving to balance or put pressure on 
the government, the government ‘has the upper hand with information’ with government 
messaging being ‘too powerful’,87 supported by the politicisation of media houses (M'Bayo 
2015). These power dynamics undermine advocacy efforts and are particularly notable in the 
realm of taxation, which has long been presented as a field of engagement for a relatively 
small group of experts, outside of the traditional expertise of most civil society organisations 
(see e.g. Sharp et al. 2019; Friedman 2006; Prichard 2018).  
 
This suggests the need for training for civil society organisations around tax and budget 
issues in order to ensure that debates about tax issues are more inclusive of the broader 
population. At the same time, while taxation is often presented as a highly complex area 
reserved for experts, there are aspects of many tax debates that are, in fact, straightforward 
– as with the intuitive understanding that taxpayers should ‘see’ the results from paying 
taxes. This implies that civil society tax campaigning should focus on simple messages and 
activities. Rather than engaging in the finer details of tax law, campaigns should focus on 
clear and accessible messages, such as ensuring compliance by the wealthy, accounting for 
tax revenues within government budgets, and monitoring public expenditures. In particular, 
Prichard (2018) suggests that local campaigning could benefit from making efforts more 
responsive to local priorities by focusing on local fiscal burdens, developing locally owned 
and small-scale research and advocacy initiatives, supporting taxpayer education and 
dialogue with government, and strengthening links between tax and expenditures. 
  
 
82 Sierra Leone interview #21. 
83 Sierra Leone interview #11. 
84 Sierra Leone interview #12. Another example of the challenge of relying on one individual for the success of 
transparency initiatives is illustrated in Kailahun, where the Council Hour radio programme was halted after the 
Information, Education, and Communication Officer that was transferred to the council failed to show up for the job 
posting. Sierra Leone interview #29. 
85 Sierra Leone interview #5.  
86 Sierra Leone interview #16. 
87 Sierra Leone interview #16. 
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4.4 Managing taxpayer expectations 
 
Aside from capacity and political constraints, expanding transparency and encouraging 
taxpayer engagement pose the additional challenge of managing taxpayer expectations 
about what may be reasonably expected as a result of paying taxes. Taxpayer education 
strategies often try to encourage tax compliance by highlighting the developmental benefits 
for which tax revenues can pay (Photo 2). This is a compelling link to make for citizens, but 
also risks inflating taxpayer expectations about what should be provided when they pay tax 
beyond what tax revenues can reasonably fund. This is particularly true at the local level, 
where tax collection is weak and revenue potential is relatively limited. Raising expectations 
beyond what local councils can deliver risks generating mistrust, anger, and disengagement 
rather than constructive tax bargaining.  
 
Photo 2 Tax education sign, Kailahun District 
 
 
 
The nature of the challenge in Sierra Leone was described by an official at the Local 
Government Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development:  
 
People expect services if they pay, but even if everyone pays, it’s impossible to deliver 
services across all the mandated areas. […] We need to make people understand that 
collection is not about collecting and providing services immediately, particularly as not 
all, or even most, of [the] collection can be used for services at the local level. Much of 
the revenues goes to paying for administration, management of waste, and salaries for 
those employees that are not paid by the central government. At the same time, the 
cost of collection in rural areas is problematic. For some taxes (e.g. market dues), it 
costs more to pay the collector, to pay for fuel, to print demand notices […] than they 
collect.88  
 
Particularly in rural areas in developing countries, recent research suggests that the costs of 
revenue mobilisation alone can consume significant portions of the revenues raised (see 
Beach 2018). As described by the Deputy Director of the Local Government Finance 
Department, ‘People don’t understand […] they think if they pay, they should get something’, 
 
88 Sierra Leone interview #2. 
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but because so much of the revenue goes to administration, ‘over time people are reluctant 
to pay’.89  
 
Indeed, after accounting for the recurrent costs of local administration, it is common that 
councils have little else to spend on development projects. For example, in 2016, Makeni, the 
third largest city in the country, spent less than US$5000 (2.4 per cent of their total budget) 
on capital rather than recurrent expenditures.90 The Revenue Supervisor of Makeni City 
Council explained,  
 
People don’t know what we’re supposed to provide. [There’s] not enough money to 
take on capital expenditures. We have limits. There are challenges communicating this. 
The expectations are very high in the city […] People blame you [us] for everything.91  
 
Likewise, in Koinadugu, in 2016 government revenues from the local (poll) tax were only 
sufficient to purchase some tools to support self-help projects for each ward in the district: 
essentially providing communities with some material support to facilitate citizens helping 
themselves, rather than actually financing any public goods or services.92 Government 
officials in Ghana highlighted similar challenges in calibrating taxpayer expectations. As 
noted by a representative of the Social Accountability Unit in the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development, a key challenge of supporting accountability is 
‘managing expectations of citizens’, noting that when citizens ‘begin to understand planning 
and budgeting… [they] expect things to be done, services to be rendered within a short 
period of time’.93  
 
The disconnect between expectations and revenue realities was made clear in focus group 
discussions with citizens, who widely believed that local government tax revenue funded 
major infrastructure projects, including roads, schools, hospitals, and sanitation projects. 
Only a few well-informed citizens – concentrated among government officials, opinion 
leaders, and some CSOs – were aware that infrastructure projects are largely funded by 
donors or central government transfers. This gap in understanding can lead to citizen 
frustration and low trust in government.94 When citizens do not see the results they expect, 
they are less likely to remain engaged in accountability processes.  
 
Efforts to promote clarity about the links between revenue and spending are further 
complicated by the nature of external financing, which can complicate citizen expectations 
and the nature of accountability channels. For example, in both Ghana and Sierra Leone 
sub-national governments receive the bulk of their resources from central government, but in 
most cases these funds are either tied to specific activities or are not controlled directly by 
local councils. Meanwhile, donor funds are unequally and irregularly divided across sub-
national locations. Citizens may see development outcomes and become frustrated with the 
lack of responsiveness of the local government, who may not control the related 
expenditures; they may likewise blame the local government for poorly delivered outcomes 
that are outside of their control.95 While having the potential to foster anger, distrust, and 
taxpayer disengagement, local governments are sometimes able to benefit from this 
ambiguity. For example, the Chief Administrator of Makeni City Council explained that in 
trying to encourage taxpayer compliance, the council tells taxpayers that their own tax 
 
89 Sierra Leone interview #1. 
90 This took the form of the rehabilitation of the public toilet in the lorry park. 
91 Sierra Leone interview #23. 
92 Sierra Leone interview #26. 
93 Ghana interview #5. 
94 Ghana interview #5.  
95 Evidence suggests that under certain circumstances citizens may be relatively unconcerned about where funding comes 
from; they simply want to see positive results (Sacks 2012: van den Boogaard 2020). 
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revenues have funded certain development projects that, in reality, have been funded from 
other sources. ‘We’re not honest [with taxpayers] 100 per cent of the time’, he admitted.96   
 
In line with these realities, many government officials see their role not solely – or even 
primarily – as direct service providers, but as intermediaries and facilitators responsible for 
bringing funding and projects from other sources into the community. For instance, the chief 
property valuer in Koinadugu District Council reported that most development projects in the 
district are not funded from taxes; rather, ‘What we collect enables us to attract other funds’, 
particularly since donors increasingly ask for a community contribution for development 
projects.97 The council thus uses tax revenues, as described by the District Council 
Chairman, as ‘seed money’ to ‘show commitment’ to donors; ‘we can use the small tax 
money to attract more money’.98 Likewise, the Chief Administrator of Koinadugu saw the 
councils as mediators or lobbyists for projects from the central government or donors: ‘[We] 
use tax revenues not to provide development, but to lobby for development.’99 Some 
government officials believe that some taxpayers recognise that the council is ‘spending far 
more than [the value of] their money’, and thus getting more value for their tax revenues than 
they could get if they used it to fund public services directly.100 The complexity of this 
governance role speaks to the need for transparency to extend beyond the simple posting of 
revenue and expenditure data, in favour of a more meaningful discusssion of the role of local 
governments in using tax revenue collection to work on behalf of the community in myriad 
ways. 
 
Finally, our research suggests that citizens may anticipate forms of fiscal reciprocity which do 
not conform to common understandings of taxation and accountability. While the link 
between local tax payment and local chiefdom citizenship rights outside of Freetown is well 
established in Sierra Leone (see e.g. Fanthorpe 2001; van den Boogaard 2018),101 
misinformation about the rights conferred by the state by tax payment is pervasive in some 
regions of the country. For example, in Koinadugu district, some individuals were only willing 
to pay property tax because revenue officials falsely told them that it acted like insurance and 
would protect them from losses from fire, flooding, or other disasters.102 In certain chiefdoms 
in the Northern Province, where there are significant conflicts between farmers and Fula 
cattle herders over land boundaries, people described a willingness and even desire to pay 
property tax as they believed that it would give them legal title to their land, though the legal 
value of proof of property tax payment is unclear.103 These findings offer an additional 
understanding of taxpayer expectations and understanding of accountability related to tax 
payment, highlighting the potential for taxpayers to have inflated expectations about what to 
expect from tax payment. 
 
These complexities do not undermine the value of transparency and taxpayer engagement. 
Inflated demands for services can generate positive incentives for improved performance, 
while also creating incentives for greater transparency by governments forced to manage 
popular expectations. Popular demands can generate useful pressure on local authorities to 
mobilise resources and projects from donors or higher levels of government and ensure they 
 
96 Sierra Leone interview #22. 
97 Sierra Leone interview #27. He cited a 4.3 per cent district contribution to a 700 million Le (around US$71,400) project 
funded by donors. 
98 Sierra Leone interview #26. 
99 Sierra Leone interview #25. 
100 Sierra Leone interview #26. 
101 For instance, interviews and focus group discussions made clear that people often pay local tax willingly in order to 
ensure voting rights within elections for traditional authorities and to ensure they have the right to go to the traditional 
court or make complaints to the chief. 
102 Sierra Leone interview #28. 
103 Recent research from Nigeria (Goodfellow and Owen 2018) and Ethiopia (Prichard 2015) highlights a similar link 
between property tax payments and perceived property rights. 
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are well implemented. Indeed, it seems likely that government officials may have greater 
incentive to play an effective intermediary role when taxpayers are more fully engaged. 
 
Nevertheless, transparency initiatives are likely to be most successful – and most likely to 
spark productive tax bargaining – where they manage both to provide information about 
public finances and meaningfully engage the public in a broader discussion about local 
governance and service provision. Evidence suggests that this is possible. Jibao and 
Prichard (2015) show how Bo City Council in Sierra Leone was able to communicate to 
taxpayers the ways in which new tax revenues would be used to support incremental 
increases in small-scale locally-provided services. These efforts were an entry point to 
broader engagement and gained widespread popular support. They were likewise dependent 
on proactive outreach by the government through interactive channels of engagement, 
including radio shows, town hall meetings and engagement through local intermediaries, 
including local chiefs, religious leaders, community leaders and business associations. The 
challenge for transparency initiatives correspondingly lies in promoting popular engagement 
and demand making, while simultaneously ensuring taxpayers understand the limits of 
available funds and the diversity of activities for which they are used. In line with the 
discussion above, this points to the importance of supporting interactive forms of 
transparency that allow for dialogue and ongoing communication.  
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
There is now significant evidence that bargaining around taxation can be a driver of 
expanded responsiveness and accountability. However, these positive connections are not 
guaranteed and there is a corresponding need for governments and donors to take proactive 
steps to encourage productive bargaining around taxation. Existing research has offered only 
relatively high-level guidance about what such support might look like. We have 
correspondingly sought to better understand the micro-level dynamics of supporting effective 
bargaining over taxation and strengthened accountability. We unpack specific messages 
about how best to achieve two goals: (1) strengthening the tax transparency that underpins 
citizen engagement and demand making, and (2) providing direct support to expand taxpayer 
engagement with tax issues.  
 
There has long been a widely held belief that expanded transparency can be a critical spur to 
greater accountability by giving citizens access to information that can both motivate and 
facilitate political action. This same rationale has underpinned recent accounts of potential 
strategies for supporting tax bargaining. But there is also a need for caution: research over 
the past decade has made clear that transparency is not a guarantee of improved outcomes 
– and, in some cases, may actually contribute to expanded distrust between citizens and 
governments. Successful transparency initiatives need to provide the right types of 
information, using channels that reach the target population and in ways that are engaging 
and meaningful for promoting engagement. Despite the nominal expansion of transparency 
and taxpayer education programmes, these goals have rarely been achieved in practice. 
Instead, our case study evidence suggests that most taxpayers have very limited 
understanding of the taxes that are due, that information about revenue collection and public 
expenditure frequently reaches very few taxpayers, and that what information is provided is 
often provided in ways that are neither useful nor engaging. 
 
In order to improve the effectiveness of transparency initiatives our case studies suggest that 
governments, donors, and civil society partners should focus on four key elements in order to 
ensure that they are promoting meaningful transparency that is tailored to the needs of 
citizens. 
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1. Ensure that the information provided to taxpayers addresses their key concerns and 
provides a basis for active engagement. Taxpayer education programmes tend to 
focus on convincing taxpayers to pay taxes, rather than demonstrating how tax 
revenues are used. Critically, information on public spending needs to be organised 
into categories that make sense to taxpayers, rather than according to the accounting 
categories of governments.  
 
2. Focus on communication through platforms with a broad popular reach. 
Communication about tax issues by governments has continued to be dominated by 
billboards and official budget information posted at government offices. However, 
accessing government offices can be costly and intimidating, and depends on 
significant levels of education, while billboards are widely viewed as ineffectual for 
communicating meaningful information. Taxpayers expressed much greater support 
for reliance on communication via radio – and particularly call-in radio shows – and 
TV, where available. 
 
3. Emphasise interactive forms of transparency, rather than one-way communication of 
information. The clearest message from respondents was a preference for forms of 
transparency that allowed space to ask questions, engage with government directly, 
and highlight their needs and desires. This was reflected in particular through support 
for call-in radio shows, as well as positive citizen reception of joint training 
programmes bringing government officials together with taxpayers.  
 
4. Focus on accessibility and inclusivity for marginalised groups. When tailoring 
transparency initiatives to the needs of citizens it is important to be sensitive to 
potential differences across groups in how they access and use information. For 
example, relying on information posted at government offices may not only be 
ineffective in general, but might be particularly ineffective for women or other 
marginalised or disadvantaged groups. 
 
While strengthening transparency is intended to provide a foundation for taxpayers to 
engage more actively with governments around taxation, it is equally necessary that 
governments, donors, and civil society actors actively support taxpayer engagement efforts. 
Without this support, there is a risk that transparency will not translate into meaningful action 
– and, indeed, that taxpayers will come to view transparency as serving little broader 
purpose. The importance of strengthening engagement is rooted in evidence that taxpayers 
currently engage very little and face substantial barriers to doing so. In particular, taxpayers 
often express nervousness about engagement owing to fear of reprisals, lacking the 
necessary information to do so effectively, and regarding engagement as relatively futile, with 
government forums perceived as encouraging tax compliance but not responding to taxpayer 
concerns. Four key lessons emerge to support appropriate and inclusive forums of 
engagement.  
 
1. Ensure that forums for engagement are perceived to be safe, secure and genuinely 
open spaces for dialogue with government. Too often, existing forums are viewed as 
threatening to taxpayers unaccustomed to engaging with tax issues and are 
perceived to be pro forma exercises rather than spaces in which taxpayer concerns 
are taken seriously. It is thus essential to take proactive steps to make these forums 
welcoming and accessible, to offer assurances that there is no risk to taxpayers, and 
to generate a genuine responsiveness to taxpayer concerns. Our research suggests 
that these goals can be achieved through modest and incremental shifts in tone and 
content, potentially including presenting information in ways that are accessible to 
less educated audiences, demonstrating concrete efforts to address taxpayer 
concerns following engagement forums, and including credible taxpayer allies in 
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these forums. More inclusive processes, like participatory budgeting, thus appear 
particularly useful because they combine the provision of information, genuine 
interaction and immediate responsiveness to taxpayer priorities. 
 
2. Adapt engagement efforts to local contexts, including by engaging trusted community 
actors. Across our case studies we find that credible community allies can play an 
important role in supporting engagement, with the relevant and trustworthy authorities 
varying across and within countries. In turn, taxpayer expectations and areas of 
concern may also vary. While it is generally assumed that taxpayers are primarily 
concerned with receiving public services in return for their tax payments, in practice 
taxpayer understandings may be more complex. In some cases, taxpayers may be 
more concerned with reducing harassment and abuse, or securing various types of 
rights or local legitimacy in return for their tax payments, or may wish to see local 
governments work more effectively on their behalf in negotiating services with central 
government or donors. In other cases, taxpayers may, in fact, have few expectations 
of reciprocity – or may have unrealistic expectations of what they can expect in return 
for tax payments – and civil society will be most effective when it can engage with 
taxpayers in relation to these local understandings. 
 
3. Civil society should aim to play an important role as a translator, enabler, and trainer 
for engagement efforts. While civil society may sometimes play a role in mobilising 
large-scale tax protests, supporting effective tax bargaining on a day-to-day basis is 
likely to depend on civil society playing the roles of translator, enabler and trainer. 
Given the relative complexity of tax issues – and the traditional absence of public 
discussion – civil society, including the media, can play a critical role in helping 
taxpayers to better understand tax and spending issues. This may often involve a 
quite literal translation role, for example, translating information into local languages 
and making official data meaningful and accessible to local communities. In turn, civil 
society groups can play a role in helping taxpayers to develop collective demands 
and to engage constructively in public forums, by informing them of the kinds of 
demands that are legitimate, giving confidence to efforts to advance these demands 
and offering support in acting collectively. Finally, our research finds significant 
support within communities – and, in some cases, among governments – for training 
initiatives designed to help taxpayers to make sense of revenue and spending issues 
and to understand their legal rights and methods for advancing their concerns, and 
for initiatives which bring taxpayers face-to-face with government officials to discuss 
their respective rights and responsibilities in relation to taxation. 
 
4. Pay special attention to supporting engagement by traditionally marginalised groups.  
Because tax has traditionally been presented as the preserve of experts, barriers to 
participation may be particularly high for traditionally marginalised groups. Where 
governments rely on intermediaries such as business associations, traditional 
authorities, or religious leaders, they need to be aware of the gendered nature of 
these actors.  
 
Successful implementation will demand attention to at least two persistent constraints: 
funding and political resistance. Supporting transparency and engagement initiatives is not 
hugely costly but does nonetheless require basic funding, as well as the dedicated time, 
sincere commitment and engagement of relatively senior officials. Our case studies point 
towards clear cases where funding and human resources became barriers to rolling out more 
effective initiatives. In turn, this funding problem is tied to a broader political challenge: 
governments are frequently sceptical of – or downright resistant to – expanded tax 
transparency and engagement. As such, in the short term there appears to be a clear role for 
donors and higher levels of government to play in financially supporting and encouraging 
these types of initiatives, which should vary depending on local or national contexts. This is 
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not, of course, a sustainable solution and the long-term goal should be to demonstrate the 
value of these initiatives to governments themselves. It is here that advocacy around taxation 
is unique: while greater transparency and engagement can create new pressures on 
governments, it can also build public trust and encourage greater tax compliance and 
support for the future expansion of taxation. These types of initiatives thus have the potential 
to be a ‘win-win’ if implemented effectively from the outset. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Taxpayer surveys 
 
In Sierra Leone the research was undertaken in all four provinces of the country, in eight (of 
14) districts. Districts were selected purposively based on geographic and qualitative 
variation.104 The core research instrument was a survey of 2,203 taxpayers, which was 
implemented in each district headquarter town using census enumeration areas provided by 
Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL). In Ghana the research was undertaken in three regions, in six 
(of 216) districts, and in six distinct locations within those districts. These locations were 
selected to provide an appropriate cross-section of Ghana based on several key comparative 
variables including resource wealth and urbanity. In these locations, 1,101 taxpayers were 
surveyed using census enumeration area maps provided by the Ghana Statistical Service 
(GSS).  
Table 1 Case districts 
Country 
case 
study Province District case 
District 
headquarter 
town 
District 
population 
(SSL 2016: 30; 
GSS 2012) 
Percent of 
district 
population 
urban 
Survey 
sample 
size 
Number 
of 
focus 
groups 
Sierra 
Leone 
East Kailahun Kailahun 526,379 29 274 3 
Kono Koidu 505,767 25 270 2 
Western Western Area 
Rural 
Waterloo 442,951 90 245 4 
Western Area 
Urban 
Freetown 1,050,301 100 306 5 
South Bo Bo 574,201 34 289 3 
Moyamba Moyamba 318,064 7 277 4 
North Koinadugu Kabala 409,372 18 271 3 
Bombali Makeni 606,544 29 271 3 
Ghana 
Western 
Sekondi Sekondi-Takoradi 229,579 94 126 1 
Takoradi Sekondi-Takoradi 329,969 98 127 3 
Western 
Tarkwa, 
Tarkwa-Nsuaem Tarkwa 
 
90,447105 
 
30 60 3 
Nsuta, Tarkwa-
Nsuaem 30 200 1 
Northern 
Savelugu-
Nanton Savelugu 139,283 40 112 4 
Sagnerigu Sagnerigu 148,099 63 135 4 
Greater 
Accra 
Region 
La-Nkwantang 
Madina Madina 111,926 84 125 4 
Ledzokuku-
Krowor Teshie-Nungua 227,932 100 127 4 
 
  
 
104 Since the time that this research was carried out, two additional districts have been added.  
105 A population figure is only available for Tarkwa-Nsuaem municipality as a whole.  
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Appendix 2 Focus group discussions 
 
  Date Type of focus group Location 
SLE 1 26-Jul-
17 
Business owners Moyamba, Moyamba District 
SLE 2 25-Jul-
17 
Civil society Moyamba, Moyamba District 
SLE 3 24-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Moyamba, Moyamba District 
SLE 4 24-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Moyamba, Moyamba District 
SLE 5 2-Aug-
17 
Business owners Bo, Bo District 
SLE 6 31-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Bo, Bo District 
SLE 7 31-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Bo, Bo District 
SLE 8 25-Jul-
17 
Civil society Kabala, Koinadugu District 
SLE 9 25-Jul-
17 
Business owners Kabala, Koinadugu District 
SLE 10 26-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Kabala, Koinadugu District 
SLE 11 30-Jul-
17 
Civil society Makeni, Bombali District 
SLE 12 31-Jul-
17 
Business owners Makeni, Bombali District 
SLE 13 31-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Makeni, Bombali District 
SLE 14 22-Jul-
17 
Business owners Koidu, Kono District 
SLE 15 22-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Koidu, Kono District 
SLE 16 2-Aug-
17 
Civil society Kailahun, Kailahun District 
SLE 17 29-Jul-
17 
Business owners Kailahun, Kailahun District 
SLE 18 29-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Kailahun, Kailahun District 
SLE 19 6-May-
17 
Taxpayers East Ward, Freetown 
SLE 20 29-Jul-
17 
Civil society Freetown 
SLE 21 3-Aug-
17 
Taxpayers Freetown 
SLE 22 3-Aug-
17 
Taxpayers Freetown 
SLE 23 5-Aug-
17 
Business owners Freetown 
SLE 24 21-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers  Western Area Rural  
SLE 25 22-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Western Area Rural 
SLE 26 25-Jul-
17 
Business owners Western Area Rural 
SLE 27 27-Jul-
17 
Taxpayers Western Area Rural 
GHA 1 28-Aug-
17 
District officials Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, 
Sekondi-Takoradi, Western Region 
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GHA 2 28-Aug-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, 
Sekondi-Takoradi, Western Region 
GHA 3 29-Aug-
17 
Civil society organisations Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, 
Sekondi-Takoradi, Western Region 
GHA 4 08-Sep-
17 
Citizens Takoradi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Western Region 
GHA 5 08-Sep-
17 
Citizens Sekondi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Western Region 
GHA 6 05-Sep-
17 
District officials Tarkwa-Nsuaem Municipal Assembly, Tarka-
Nsuaem, Western Region 
GHA 7 06-Sep-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
Tarkwa-Nsuaem Municipal Assembly, Tarka-
Nsuaem, Western Region 
GHA 8 06-Sep-
17 
Civil society organisations Tarkwa-Nsuaem Municipal Assembly, Tarka-
Nsuaem, Western Region 
GHA 9 07-Sep-
17 
Citizens Tarkwa, Tarka-Nsuaem, Western Region 
GHA 10 07-Sep-
17 
Citizens Nsuta, Tarka-Nsuaem, Western Region 
GHA 11 11-Sep-
17 
District officials Savelugu-Nanton Municipal Assembly, 
Savelugu-Nanton, Northern Region 
GHA 12 12-Sep-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
Savelugu-Nanton Municipal Assembly, 
Savelugu-Nanton, Northern Region 
GHA 13 12-Sep-
17 
Civil society organisations Savelugu-Nanton Municipal Assembly, 
Savelugu-Nanton, Northern Region 
GHA 14 14-Sep-
17 
Citizens Savelugu-Nanton, Northern Region 
GHA 15 11-Sep-
17 
District officials Sagnerigu District Assembly, Sagnerigu, 
Northern Region 
GHA 16 13-Sep-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
Sagnerigu District Assembly, Sagnerigu, 
Northern Region 
GHA 17 15-Sep-
17 
Civil society organisations Sagnerigu District Assembly, Sagnerigu, 
Northern Region 
GHA 18 14-Sep-
17 
Citizens Sagnerigu, Northern Region 
GHA 19 18-Sep-
17 
District officials La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly, 
Madina, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 20 18-Sep-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly, 
Madina, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 21 19-Sep-
17 
Civil society organisations La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly, 
Madina, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 22 20-Sep-
17 
Citizens La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly, 
Madina, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 23 26-Sep-
17 
District officials Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal District, Teshie-
Nungua, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 24 26-Sep-
17 
Traditional authorities/ 
opinion leaders 
Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal District, Teshie-
Nungua, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 25 03-Oct-
2017 
Civil society organisations Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal District, Teshie-
Nungua, Greater Accra Region 
GHA 26 27-Sep-
17 
Citizens Teshie, Greater Accra Region 
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Appendix 3 Interviews 
 
  Date Interviewee Location 
SLE 1 1-Dec-16 Representative, Local Government Finance 
Department, Intergovernmental Fiscal Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
Freetown 
SLE 2 1-Dec-16 Representative, Local Government Finance 
Department, Intergovernmental Fiscal Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
Freetown 
SLE 3 6-Dec-16 Taxpayer Freetown 
SLE 4 13-Dec-16 Economist, Local Government Finance Department, 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Affairs, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development 
Freetown 
SLE 5 14-Dec-16 Representative, BAN Freetown 
SLE 6 14-Dec-16 Representative, Decentralization Secretariat Freetown 
SLE 7 14-Dec-16 Civil society representative Freetown 
SLE 8 14-Dec-16 Research Director, National Revenue Authority  Freetown 
SLE 9 23-Mar-17 Deputy Chief Administrator, Kailahun District Council Kailahun, 
Kailahun District 
SLE 10 23-Mar-17 Quarter Youth Chairman, Luawa Chiefdom Kailahun, 
Kailahun District 
SLE 11 27-Mar-17 Valuation Officer, Kailahun District Council Kailahun, 
Kailahun District 
SLE 12 11-Apr-17 Senior Advisor, Revenue Development Foundation Toronto, Canada 
SLE 13 4-May-17 Economist, Local Government Finance Department, 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Affairs, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development 
Freetown 
SLE 14 5-May-17 Executive Director, National Movement for Justice 
and Democracy 
Freetown 
SLE 15 5-May-17 Civil society representative Freetown 
SLE 16 6-May-17 Economic Governance Officer, OSIWA Freetown 
SLE 17 6-May-17 Area chief, East ward Freetown 
SLE 18 8-May-17 Executive Director, Open Tax Initiative Freetown 
SLE 19 12-May-17 Civil society representative Freetown 
SLE 20 16-May-17 Central Chiefdom Administrative Clerk, Bombali 
District 
Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 21 16-May-17 Former Revenue Development Foundation employee Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 22 16-May-17 Chief Administrator, Makeni City Council Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 23 16-May-17 Revenue Supervisor, Makeni City Council Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 24 19-May-17 Central Chiefdom Administrative Clerk, Koinadugu 
District  
Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
District 
SLE 25 20-May-17 Chief Administrator, Koinadugu District Council Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
District 
SLE 26 22-May-17 Chairman, Koinadugu District Council  Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
District 
SLE 27 22-May-17 Valuator, Koinadugu District Council Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
District 
SLE 28 23-May-17 Revenue Collector, Koinadugu District Council Fadugu, 
Koinadugu 
District 
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SLE 29 12-Jun-17 Deputy Chairman, Kailahun District Council Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
District 
SLE 30 14-Jun-17 Chairman, Kailahun District Council Kailahun, 
Kailahun District 
SLE 31 22-Jun-17 Information, Education, and Communications Officer, 
Kono District Council 
Koidu, Kono 
District 
SLE 32 21-Jul-17 Village Headman, Western Rural District Waterloo, 
Western Rural 
District 
SLE 33 22-Jul-17 District Manager, National Revenue Authority Koidu, Kono 
District 
SLE 34 22-Jul-17 Information, Education, and Communication Officer, 
Koidu City Council 
Koidu, Kono 
District 
SLE 35 24-Jul-17 Chief Administrator, Moyamba City Council Moyamba, 
Moyamba District 
SLE 36 26-Jul-17 Paramount Chief, Hastings Hastings, 
Western Rural 
District 
SLE 37 27-Jul-17 Councillor Western Rural 
District 
SLE 38 27-Jul-17 Manager, Ecobank Western Rural 
District 
SLE 39 28-Jul-17 Senior Collector, National Revenue Authority Freetown 
SLE 40 29-Jul-17 Information, Education, and Communication Officer, 
Freetown City Council 
Freetown 
SLE 41 30-Jul-17 Valuator, Bombali District Council Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 42 01-Aug-17 Chief Administrator, Bo District Council Bo, Bo District 
SLE 43 01-Aug-17 Valuation Officer, Bo District Council Bo, Bo District 
SLE 44 2-Aug-17 Finance Office Assistant, Freetown City Council Freetown 
SLE 45 3-Aug-17 Regional Officer, National Revenue Authority Freetown 
SLE 46 5-Aug-17 Anonymous City Councillor, Freetown City Council Freetown 
SLE 47 1-Nov-17 Chief Administrator, Makeni City Council Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 48 1-Nov-17 Deputy Chief Administrator, Makeni City Council Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 49 1-Nov-17 Secretary General, Traders’ Union Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 50 3-Nov-17 Treasury Clerk, Wara Wara Yagal Chiefdom Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
SLE 51 3-Nov-17 Chairman, Traders’ Union, Koinadugu and Falaba 
District 
Kabala, 
Koinadugu 
SLE 52 6-Nov-17 Treasury Clerk, Bombali Shebora Chiefdom Makeni, Bombali 
District 
SLE 53 6-Nov-17 Secretary General, Motor Drivers’ Union Makeni, Bombali 
District  
SLE 54 7-Nov-17 Chairman, Tailors’ Union Makeni, Bombali 
District 
GHA 1 12-May-17 Project Director, IncluCity Project, Global 
Communities 
Sekondi-
Takoradi, 
Western Region 
GHA 2 18-May-17 Programme Director, STAR-Ghana Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 3 19-May-17 
and 02-
Oct-17 
Official, Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC) 
Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 4 26-Sept-17 Official, Fiscal Decentralization Unit (FDU), Ministry 
of Finance 
Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
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GHA 5 27-Sept-17 Official, Social Accountability Unit (SAU), Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) 
Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 6 28-Sept-17 Project Manager, Internally Generated Funds, GIZ Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 7 03-Oct-17 Member, OccupyGhana Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 8 04-Oct-17 Journalist (radio) Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 9 06-Oct-17 Official, Ghana Revenue Authority Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
GHA 10 06-Oct-17 Official, Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development  
Accra, Greater 
Accra Region 
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